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The ability to readily access social group representations and automatically categorize others as 
members of social groups plays a central role in our social lives. This ability helps us guide our 
behavior by providing a rich set of information about unknown individuals based on the existing 
knowledge stored in our semantic system. Neuropsychological studies reporting the presence of 
patients with dementia disproportionally impaired at processing social group knowledge, with spared 
knowledge about other categories, together with patients presenting the opposite pattern, led to 
propose that social groups might well be represented separately from categories such as animals, 
plants or objects. 
The organization of the semantic system in categories is consistent with several theories 
arguing that the relevance of the sensory and functional information, or features, forming a 
representation varies depending on the semantic category. The presence of a dissociation for social 
groups is however only accommodated by more recent theories that go beyond the simpler 
sensory/functional distinctions made by traditional models. Some of these theories suggest that for 
the representation of social groups a critical role is played by affective features. This hypothesis was 
corroborated by a study with brain tumor patients whose lexical semantic processing of social groups 
was affected by lesions of the left amygdala, insula and inferior frontal gyrus, all of which are also 
part of the brain network involved in processing affective information. However, beyond this finding, 
the empirical evidence in support of the affective features hypothesis put forward about social groups 
is to date relatively scarce. Thus, the aim of my dissertation is to provide the evidence of the greater 
relevance of affective features in social group representations by describing three original studies.  
 First, I have reviewed the main theories of semantic memory and affect, and then I reported 
three original studies. In Study 1, by applying transcranial magnetic stimulation on the left inferior 
frontal gyrus, previously linked to processing negative affect, I showed a link between processing 




social categories are categorized, without affecting responses to other stimuli. In Study 2, I reported 
that social category names are more susceptible to affective priming effects compared to nonsocial 
categories. The behavioral priming effect was also reflected in a late neural component measured via 
electroencephalography, where social group names displayed different amplitudes based on the 
affective congruence with the preceding prime. In Study 3 I documented that evaluative responses to 
social group names and pictures tend to be delayed compared to those towards nonsocial categories, 
despite no differences in categorical semantic access. Additionally, a multivariate pattern analysis 
(MVPA) of the neural correlates associated with this evaluation highlighted a better decoding of 
affective content for social groups in both an early, and a late time window across input modalities.  
The findings reported in my thesis provide an affirmative answer to the hypothesized greater 
relevance of affective features in social group representations. I argue that such relevance is expressed 
in terms of an affect processing region contributing to their semantic categorization, a greater benefit 
from affective priming and an enhanced affective decoding. These results hopefully add valuable 
neuroscientific evidence about how social groups are represented, contributing towards the 
identification of their neural substrate and affective electrophysiological correlates in terms of 









“Man is by nature a social animal; an individual who is unsocial naturally and not accidentally is 
either beneath our notice or more than human. Society is something that precedes the individual.” 
- Aristotle, Politics 
 
In order to survive and thrive we live next to other people in a social environment. The observation 
made by Aristotle of society preceding the individual can indicate the great influence that a perceived 
social group has on what we think of and feel about other people. In just a fraction of a second, faces 
tend to automatically be categorized as members of a given social group, based on their gender, 
ethnicity, social status or occupation, a process that precedes the processing of the face’s personal 
identity (Ito & Urland, 2003). In this instance, the ‘society’ preceding the individual is her/his social 
group, carrying along all the characteristics that are proper of that group, automatically attributed to 
the individual. For such categorization to occur, one needs to have a mental representation of the 
different categories present in our society, each with specific characterizing features. Moreover, this 
representation needs to be stored in the brain for later recollection, as indeed argued by several models 
of semantic memory described in the following paragraphs. The existence of a dedicated set of brain 
regions that support social group representations has recently been reinforced by the observation of 
patients with impaired social group representation following brain damage (Rumiati, Carnaghi, 
Improta, Diez, & Silveri, 2014). Building on extant theories suggesting that semantic representations 
are embodied by virtue of their reliance on sensory and functional processing modalities, the 
argument has been put forward of a special link between the representation of conspecifics and the 




to brain regions supporting the processing of emotions, the resulting reduced ability to do so has been 
suggested to be the leading cause to an impoverished representation of social groups (Piretti et al., 
2015).  
Beyond correlational data, the hypothesis of a special link between social groups and affective 
processes has not found supporting or disproving evidence to date, especially as compared to the 
effort that has poured in research on other categories of knowledge. By presenting an overview of the 
main theories of semantic cognition and describing a series of original studies, the aim of my thesis 
is to provide a better understanding of (a) how our conceptual knowledge about categories of 
conspecifics is represented within the affective/semantic system, (b) how the affective information 
about social groups is processed by the brain, and (c) whether the representation of social groups 
possesses unique characteristics that makes it different from that of non-social categories (in the 
affective domain). 
 
 Semantic memory and social cognition 
1.1 Semantic memory and semantic representations 
As a component of long-term memory, semantic memory is described as the storage of our 
encyclopedic, conceptual knowledge. We may know what a pen is when we see one, but we do not 
necessarily know when and where we acquired such knowledge: while the former information is 
stored in the semantic memory, the latter information is stored by the episodic memory (Patterson, 
Nestor, & Rogers, 2007). When we think about a concept, our brain recreates a representation of that 
concept, which also leads to the renewal of the related multisensory perceptual experience in the 
absence of sensory stimulation. “Representation” will be thus intended here as the act by which 
consciousness, as a result of sparse neural activity (Dehaene, Changeux, Naccache, Sackur, & 
Sergent, 2006), reproduces an external object, or an internal object such as mood or a fantastic 




human brain, the representation of the concept ‘pen’ will thus comprise the features that characterize 
it, which could be its shape, purpose and use. As pens come in different shapes and forms, according 
to the Prototype theory, the immediate mental representation we form after reading the word ‘pen’ 
would consist of the features that our idea of the standard, prototypical pen possesses (Fillmore, 
1975). All these features will also be reciprocally linked to the entry in the mental lexicon for the 
word ‘pen’, the symbol used to refer to that concept (Binder, Desai, Graves, & Conant, 2009; 
Leshinskaya & Caramazza, 2016). The single symbols (i.e., words, or lexical items) linking to our 
conceptual knowledge are held by some theories to be organized in a lexical-semantic network made 
of nodes and relationships, allowing words to be also represented separately from the sensory and 
functional features of the concepts they refer to (e.g., Leshinskaya & Caramazza, 2016). The strength 
of the links between entries in the network is dictated by two factors. The first factor is their spatio-
temporal contingency, or statistical co-occurrence (Simmons, Hamann, Harenski, Hu, & Barsalou, 
2008; Vigliocco, Meteyard, Andrews, & Kousta, 2009), as in the word ‘pen’ often appearing next to 
the word ‘paper’, and the second factor consists of the similarities and overlap of their features (Farah 
& McClelland, 1991; Rogers et al., 2004), such as the color and use of the words ‘paper’ and ‘board’. 
When it comes to the question as to how the brain represents concepts in the first place, a very popular 
view, common to several theories, argues that semantic knowledge is grounded into perception and 
action. Our conceptual understanding would be thus dependent on the way our body interacts with 
the environment and the brain areas processing that information, for which semantic knowledge 
would be itself ‘embodied’. As will be described more in detail in the following sections, there is 
convergent evidence that shows how semantic representations follow a hierarchical organization 
which is partially embodied. As such, this organization contains both distributed modality- and 
attribute-specific systems and amodal single-locus systems that abstract knowledge from 





1.2 Evidence for category-specificity in semantic knowledge 
The first cases of category-specific semantic impairments were described by Warrington and 
colleagues (Warrington, 1975; Warrington & Mccarthy, 1983; Warrington & Shallice, 1984).  Some 
patients were disproportionally impaired at recognizing pictures representing animals and plants 
when presented with their names during an identification task; in contrast, they performed much better 
when they were presented with names of man-made objects. Later reports of patients presenting the 
reverse pattern, that is, a disproportionate recognition of objects compared to animals and plants (for 
reviews, see Capitani, Laiacona, Mahon, & Caramazza, 2003, and Thompson-Schill, 2003), led to 
suggest a living/non-living distinction in semantic representations. The correlation between the type 
of semantic deficit and lesioned brain areas (Warrington, 1975; Warrington & Shallice, 1984), with 
damage to visual regions and motor regions leading, respectively, to deficits for living and non-living 
things, was later also observed in healthy individuals using imaging techniques. Martin and 
colleagues, using positron emission tomography (PET), reported how naming animals activated brain 
regions associated with visual processing, whereas for tools led to a greater activation in areas 
associated with motor actions, such as the left premotor area (Martin, Haxby, Lalonde, Wiggs, & 
Ungerleider, 1995; Martin, Wiggs, Ungerleider, & Haxby, 1996). 
 
1.3 Category-specificity in social cognition 
The idea of our knowledge about other people as also being represented by a distinct neural substrate 
was first suggested by neuropsychological studies reporting patients with an inability to name and 
recall more detailed information about otherwise familiar people as a consequence of brain damage 
(e.g., Miceli et al., 2000; Thompson et al., 2004). The category-specificity of conspecifics was made 
evident not only by patients with an impairment sparing knowledge about the semantic categories of 
objects or animals, but also by patients showing the reverse pattern i.e., an impairment for objects 




Lyons, Kay, Hanley, & Haslam, 2006; Thompson et al., 2004). Rumiati and colleagues (Rumiati et 
al., 2014) later also described patients with specific impairments in their knowledge about social 
groups, revealing how impairments for conspecifics can also occur at a supraordinate, categorical 
level. In order to better understand what makes the representation of social categories unique, the 
following sections will provide a description of the different theories initially formulated to explain 
the category-specific deficits first reported only among non-social categories (for reviews, see 
Capitani, Laiacona, Mahon, & Caramazza, 2003, and Thompson-Schill, 2003), their evolution, and 
their explanation of the emergence of semantic deficits for conspecifics. 
 
1.4 Theories of semantic memory 
One of the first theoretical accounts on the emergence of the category-specific deficits is the 
sensory/functional theory (SFT) first proposed by Warrington and Shallice (1984). The theory holds 
that categorical deficits emerge because of damage to systems processing modality-specific 
information, either sensory or functional, in which living and non-living things, respectively, are 
represented. With this interpretation, Warrington and Shallice first introduce the seeds for the later 
theories of embodied cognition, whereby the contents of semantic cognition are based on perception 
and action (e.g., Barsalou, 2010), an organizational principle also found to emerge in computational 
models of the conceptual semantic system (Farah & McClelland, 1991). 
A different theory, the domain-specific hypothesis (DSH; Caramazza & Shelton, 1998), 
suggests instead that distinct semantic categories are processed by specific brain networks developed 
as a result of evolutionary pressure. Although, as I will discuss later, the theory has since been updated 
(Mahon & Caramazza, 2009), in its original formulation, semantic categories emerged because their 
unique survival relevance related to nutrition, escaping from predators or reproduction. According to 
this interpretation, any relationship that a category has with a specific sensory or motor feature or 




endorses to some extent the embodied view of semantic memory. Nevertheless, an emphasis is put 
on the greater independence of conceptual knowledge systems from sensory/motor ones. 
 
1.4.1 Beyond the animate/inanimate distinction 
Although sufficient in explaining the living/non-living dissociations initially reported, both the SFT 
and the DSH needed to be refined in order to accommodate later findings of patients with deficits in 
sub-categories within the living/non-living distinction. Within the living category, beyond the deficits 
for conspecifics (e.g., Miceli et al., 2000), single cases have been reported with selective deficits also 
for fruits/vegetables (Hart et al., 1983; Samson & Pillon, 2003) and for animals (Blundo et al., 2006; 
Caramazza & Shelton, 1998). Such findings led to both a reformulation of the existing theories, but 
also the formulation of new ones, each nowadays enjoying different degrees of support. I will here 
briefly describe some of the most accredited theories by dividing them according to the way in which 
embodiment is interpreted (Meteyard, Cuadrado, Bahrami, & Vigliocco, 2012; Meteyard & 
Vigliocco, 2008). Based on how the interaction between semantic representations and 
perceptual/motor modalities is explained, theories either belong to the ‘secondary activation’ (or 
secondary embodiment) or to the ‘mediation’ (or weak embodiment) categories. 
 
1.4.2 Secondary activation theories 
Secondary activation theories argue that semantic representations are not dependent on sensory 
information and thus are amodal. The link to sensory-motor content is present in the form of a 
secondary activation deriving from the existent connections between an independent semantic 
system, and the sensory and motor systems. Damage to sensory/functional modules would thus result 




As a first theory of the kind, the hub-and-spokes model (Lambon Ralph, Jefferies, Patterson, 
& Rogers, 2016; Noonan, Jefferies, Visser, & Lambon Ralph, 2013; Patterson, Nestor, & Rogers, 
2007; Rogers et al., 2004) went beyond the initial binary sensory/functional distinction by holding 
that the process by which conceptual representations are formed consists of an interplay between a 
central amodal module (the ‘hub’) and several, modality-specific areas (‘spokes’). Accordingly, the 
modality-specific information of the spokes would be abstracted away by the hub, rendering it purely 
symbolic. Whereas damage to the hub, located in the anterior temporal lobes (ATL), would result in 
semantic impairments across categories, as observed in semantic dementia patients (e.g., Jefferies, 
Patterson, Jones, & Lambon Ralph, 2009), damage to modality-specific areas would impair the 
processing of knowledge features related to sound, praxis, function, vision, valence, and mental 
lexicon. Thus, damage to the praxis spoke would in turn impair the knowledge of a specific semantic 
category mostly relying on that knowledge. For instance, lesions to the temporo-parietal area, 
involved in the processing of praxis-related information, have been found to lead to an impairment 
of the semantic representation of man-made tools, for which their most relevant semantic feature 
relates mainly to their use (e.g., Buxbaum & Saffran, 2002). 
Another secondary activation theory, the distributed domain-specific hypothesis (distributed 
DSH; Mahon & Caramazza, 2009) holds that semantic content is distributed across several regions 
and interacts with sensory and motor information via non-arbitrary connections. Like the hub-and-
spokes model, the distributed DSH also expands the number of properties relevant for conceptual 
knowledge to include sensory processes, motor action and emotional responses. As in the original 
formulation of the theory, an organization into domain-specific networks would be the result of 
evolutionary pressure, and all semantic knowledge would be represented in an amodal, abstract 
manner. The representation of each concept would produce an activation of sensory/motor 
information, but this would only be secondary to it. Thus, areas processing semantic information 





1.4.3 Mediation theories 
Unlike secondary activation theories, the key assumption of mediation theories is that sensory/motor 
information constitutes at least part of the semantic representations. Rather than being the result of a 
secondary activation, the activity in modality/specific cortical areas, and thus their content, plays a 
key role in conceptual representations. Furthermore, the integration of single features within a 
modality would take place nearby those areas, as for the combination of features across modalities, 
according to a principle of spatial proximity. The explanation of interaction effects between word 
processing and perception/action is to be found in a mediation process by areas adjacent to primary 
sensory and motor areas, and presenting reciprocal connections (Meteyard et al., 2012). In this way 
the activation of semantic content and the processing in primary areas are not completely independent, 
and the strength of the reciprocal influence depends on the characteristics of the connections, but also 
on the task demands, which could make some sensory/motor features more salient than others 
(Simmons & Barsalou, 2003). 
One of such theories is the Convergence Zone (CZ) theory first proposed by Damasio 
(Damasio, 1989) and later extended by Simmons and Barsalou (Simmons & Barsalou, 2003). 
Accordingly, higher-order CZs present in association cortices respond to patterns of activation in 
adjacent sensory/motor cortices, which themselves respond to modality-specific features. 
Convergence zones would thus be part of a hierarchical neuronal organization, going from neurons 
responding to simple features (e.g., grey color) to combinations of features (e.g., visual input deriving 
from the sight of a grey dog, including its shape and motion), defined as conjunctive neurons. Unlike 
the original theorization of Damasio, which argued that CZs act as a bidirectional bridge that 
reinstates patterns of activity across the neuronal hierarchy, Simmons and Barsalou (Simmons & 
Barsalou, 2003) proposed CZs to have a representational capacity on their own. This means that 




in higher-order CZs. The authors also add to the theory a Similarity in Topography (SIT) principle, 
which predicts that the distance between two neurons in a convergence zone would be inversely 
proportional to the similarity of the features they associate. For instance, in a visual CZ, the 
conjunctive neurons responding to human faces would be located closer together to those that respond 
to faces of other mammals, as opposed to chairs. 
The grounding representation in perception, action and emotion (GRAPES) model proposed 
by Martin (Martin, 2016) is another instance of mediation theories. The model extends the original 
sensory/functional theory and differentiates itself from the CZ theory by suggesting that semantic 
memory is organized according to the properties of concepts, rather than according to sensory 
modalities. In turn, the property acquisition modality would not define the location of its neural 
substrate, which would therefore be biologically pre-determined. This proposal was driven by studies 
on the similarities between typically developing individuals and individuals with congenital 
modality-specific deficits. For example, in congenitally blind individuals (Amedi, Raz, Azulay, 
Malach, & Zohary, 2010), the recognition of an object based on tactile information, deriving from its 
never-before-seen shape, would rely on the same areas recruited in the typically developing for 
processing shape information, and partially overlapping with visual shape processing areas in the 
ventral occipital stream (Amedi, Jacobson, Hendler, Malach, & Zohary, 2002). These areas store 
information about object properties and partially overlap with the sensory-motor regions allowing to 
experience them in a specific modality. Nevertheless, as it would be the case for hearing the sound of 
an engine or reading the word ‘car’, the information about the visual properties of a car can be readily 
accessed from different input modalities. Although the representation of a concept can involve several 
areas, each dealing with a different type of property, the relevance of a property in the representation 






1.5 Social group representations and the affective features hypothesis 
While the link between the category of tools and the processing of praxis has been extensively studied 
(e.g., Martin, 2016), it remains to be fully understood which kind of features are more relevant for 
processing social categories. In reporting cases of patients impaired in processing social groups, 
Rumiati and colleagues (Rumiati et al., 2014) highlighted the importance of distinguishing between 
person-specific and group categorical knowledge in the semantic domain. This distinction is 
particularly important when drawing conclusions on the processing of conspecifics based on 
comparisons with other categories of knowledge. Accordingly, any difference emerging from the 
comparison of person-specific knowledge with knowledge about animals and objects would be 
confounded by the required level of analysis. As an example, while Ronald Reagan is a unique 
individual with very specific characteristics and only one individual will be identified as such, all 
chairs of any shape and color will always be considered as chairs. While we can discuss what all 
chairs have in common, that is, that they are supposed to be sat on, we cannot talk in the same terms 
about Ronal Reagan for obvious reasons. On the contrary, despite differences in their individual 
identities, all policemen will be considered as having the common social function. The idea that these 
two levels of analysis also imply different neural substrates is also made evident by studies showing 
a greater efficiency of social categorical knowledge extraction from faces relative to person-specific 
knowledge (Cloutier, Mason, & Macrae, 2005; Mason & Macrae, 2004), and also by evidence of 
subordinate (instance-specific) knowledge being generally more impaired than that for super-ordinate 
(categorical) concepts in neurodegenerative diseases such as semantic dementia (Patterson et al., 
2006; Rogers, Patterson, Jefferies, & Lambon Ralph, 2015). 
The first reports of neurological patients with impairments in recognizing social groups 
(Rumiati et al., 2014) and the co-occurrence of lesions in brain areas commonly linked to affective 
processes, including the amygdala and the insula (Piretti et al., 2015), together with the presence of 




may rely to a greater extent on their affective features (Piretti et al., 2015). Unlike objects, people are 
agents, that is, they originate action that can directly affect the individual. Humans therefore focus on 
knowing other people’s intentions and dispositions, whose expected consequences would serve as a 
useful source of information. Neuroimaging studies identified affect processing brain areas which 
selectively respond to social, as opposed to nonsocial stimuli, as well as areas, such as the amygdala, 
that show additive effects of a picture’s emotionality and sociality (Norris, Chen, Zhu, Small, & 
Cacioppo, 2004). 
The above theories also contain hints linking affective features to the representation of 
conspecifics. In the hub-and-spokes model, the authors suggested that impairments in the processing 
of conspecifics may derive from damage to cortical areas involved in the processing of affective 
features. This processing of valence, as they defined it, would be carried out by the orbitofrontal 
cortex, which is connected to subregions of the ATL hub via the uncinate fasciculus (Lambon Ralph 
et al., 2016). However, the authors also pointed to the lack of empirical evidence in understanding 
how affective knowledge interacts with knowledge about conspecifics. 
In one of its latest formulations, the distributed domain-specific hypothesis also suggests the 
presence of an integration of affective information especially when representing conspecifics, which 
would be less evolutionarily relevant for tools. As one of the neural correlates of this integration 
process, the theory points to the fusiform face area, which would selectively respond to faces by virtue 
of its connectivity with several regions implied in extracting socially relevant information from 
stimuli, among which the amygdala (Mahon & Caramazza, 2011). 
The link between affect and social cognition is also made explicit by other theories. For 
example, in their conceptual topography theory, Simmons and Barsalou also include an emotional 
processing modality (Simmons & Barsalou, 2003). Accordingly, emotional CZs would contain 
conjunctive neurons integrating information coming from different modalities which, based on 




While the former is hypothesized to integrate emotional and conceptual information (and is also 
highlighted by the hub-and-spokes model), the latter would bind emotional features from different 
sources, and has been indicated to be particularly relevant for decoding information from facial 
expressions and bodily postures. 
Lastly, in his GRAPES theory, Martin proposes emotion to be a conceptual property relevant 
for social knowledge, and that such socio-emotional knowledge is processed by a circuitry of regions 
for processing biological motion (superior temporal sulcus) and emotion (amygdala). Nevertheless, 
the author also recognizes the need for further studies to clarify the roles of frontal and anterior 
temporal cortices in our social knowledge (Martin, 2016). 
 
1.6 Affective features hypothesis and abstract concepts 
Given the lack of causal evidence that our knowledge about social groups is characterized by a greater 
reliance on affective features, either by secondary activation or by mediation, my thesis will be 
dedicated to the investigation of how the processing of affective information interacts with semantic 
knowledge, and whether this interaction presents some unique properties when representing social 
groups. 
Regardless of the semantic category, the contribution of affective information to conceptual 
knowledge has so far mostly been linked to the representation of abstract words. These words, such 
as “honor”, as opposed to “knight”, relate to concepts regarded as difficult, if not impossible, to 
perceive and act upon (Kousta, Vigliocco, Vinson, Andrews, & Del Campo, 2011; Vigliocco, 
Meteyard, Andrews, & Kousta, 2009). As for the hypothesis of a greater reliance on affective features 
put forward about social categories, it has been suggested that abstract concepts may be grounded in 
affective states, or that, among the several features contributing to their representation, affect plays a 




the lack of external perceptual features of abstract concepts (Barsalou & Wiemer-Hastings, 2005), 
this explanation does not apply to social categories, or at least not to the same extent. Indeed, it would 
be hard to fully attribute an increased reliance on affective features to an increased abstractness of 
social groups. Although these concepts could be considered as relatively more abstract than object 
concepts, concepts such as ‘policeman’ do possess a combination of sensory correlates, including 
visual (e.g., wearing a uniform) and motor features (i.e., bipedal motion; Papeo, Wurm, Oosterhof, & 
Caramazza, 2017), that concepts like “grace” do not possess. For these reasons, the greater weight of 
affective features will mostly be attributed to the occurrence of exclusively social emotional processes 
like mentalization and empathy. 
 
 Affective semantic knowledge 
2.1 Affective features in semantic cognition 
From an evolutionary perspective, the ability to perform fast evaluations is of utter importance to 
respond quickly to stimuli in the environment. This automatic process allows us to determine whether 
whatever we encounter is potentially harmless, beneficial or dangerous (Cacioppo & Berntson, 1999). 
Thus, at the most basic level, evaluative processes produce a positive or negative affective response 
to determine whether something is good or bad for us, which not only guides our immediate behavior, 
but stores the affective association in memory for it to be retrieved in a second moment. The 
immediate response and its recollection from memory are not processed and experienced in the same 
manner. For example, eating a candy will be associated with a pleasant experience. The concept of a 
candy elicited by reading the word will also be linked to something pleasant. In both cases, positive 
valence information is being processed, nonetheless these take place at different levels of processing. 
In his hierarchical emotion theory, Panksepp (Panksepp, 1998, 2012) argues that there are three levels 
at which affective processing can occur. The first level comprises positive or negative response 




Pavlovian learning (e.g., anticipating the positive experience of eating a candy at the sight of the 
candy); the third-level processing would coincide with the long-term memory association, which can 
be recollected even in the absence of a stimulus (e.g., reading the word ‘candy’ and knowing that it 
is associated with a pleasant experience). Some authors make an even simpler distinction between 
the terms ‘affective valence’ and ‘semantic valence’, the former being the valence of a direct 
emotional response, and the latter referring to the semantic knowledge about valence (Itkes, Kimchi, 
Haj-Ali, Shapiro, & Kron, 2017). Valence is also addressed by several theories on emotion that 
consider affect as a core component from which discrete emotional experiences, like happiness, fear, 
and anger are derived (Kuhlmann, Hofmann, & Jacobs, 2017). In turn, even if emotions are more 
complex than affective reactions, on which they are built, the two terms are often used 
interchangeably. As in the present thesis this will also be the case, the terms will always refer to the 
basic positive/negative distinction just described. 
When it comes to which brain regions support positive and negative valence processing, 
contrasting theories argued about the two valences as being processed by the same neural substrate 
(e.g., Carroll, Yik, Russell, & Barrett, 1999; Russell & Carroll, 1999), or about there being distinct 
neural substrates processing positive and negative affective information (e.g., Cacioppo, Gardner, & 
Berntson, 1999). More recent meta-analytic studies present support for both theories and suggest the 
presence of an interplay between valence-general and valence-specific regions (Cacioppo, Gardner, 
& Berntson, 1999; for a review see Lindquist et al., 2016). The presence of an even partially separable 
neural network for affective processing makes the study of affective processing increasingly complex. 
The possibility of positive and negative valence being processed separately also imply the possibility 
that the same stimulus can be associated with both positive and negative affect, whose immediate 
relevance is context and goal-dependent (Man, Nohlen, Melo, & Cunningham, 2017). An example of 
this can be the concept of ‘exercising’, linked to both fatigue and the reward of keeping fit. Even with 




more dominant association will influence early, automatic evaluative processes regardless of task 
demands, whereas later processing may involve adjusting the initial affective association with a 
conflicting one, and thus elicit greater reflective processing driven by contextual information and task 
demands (Cunningham, Raye, & Johnson, 2004; Cunningham & Zelazo, 2007). As affective 
responses are highly subjective, if different brain areas are involved in the processing of negative and 
positive affect, this means that the processing of the same stimulus by two individuals may not always 
involve the same neural substrate, a factor that needs to be taken into account. 
Either in Panksepp’s third-level processing, in the concept of ‘affective valence’, affective 
theories converge with the previously outlined semantic theories suggesting valence (or, more 
generally, affect and emotion) to constitute a distinct feature of semantic representations (e.g., 
Lambon Ralph et al., 2016; Mahon & Caramazza, 2011; Martin, 2016; Simmons & Barsalou, 2003). 
Although related to semantic knowledge, affective knowledge has been shown to possess an at least 
a partially distinct neural substrate, leading to different behavioral outcomes. For instance, whereas 
semantic information (i.e., nonaffective) would drive instrumental goal-directed behaviors in frontal 
brain regions, affective information has been argued to directly drive behaviors of approach and 
avoidance with the contribution of the amygdala (Amodio & Ratner, 2011). Other studies also show 
how the areas involved in affective and non-affective processing in general are highly anatomically 
interconnected and communicating reciprocally (Ghashghaei & Barbas, 2002), which allows for a 
study of their interaction and their interdependence. If we think of features as the building blocks of 
semantic representations, it may seem straightforward to assume that their perception precedes the 
full conscious conceptual representation. Identifying an object involves first processing its single 
physical properties, like its color and shape. However, affective features can only be extracted after 
the perceptual encoding, and they will differ from individual to individual. One can then ask whether 
it is possible to discern between valence as being stored in memory, rather than being derived from a 




also be based on a memory storage, although accessed in a more controlled manner (Cunningham & 
Zelazo, 2007). 
 
2.2 Affective features in priming studies 
A first empirical indication of how affect can be conceived as a conceptual property is given by 
studies showing the influence of pre-activating affective valence processing on semantic access. As 
previously stated, the strength of the associations within the semantic network is also determined by 
the features shared by two concepts. Semantic priming paradigms have been extensively used to 
measure these associations also by means of spreading of activation, which could be derived from the 
processing of common specific features (e.g., the word ‘strawberry’ preceding the word ‘cherry, both 
referring to something red, sweet and edible; Collins & Loftus, 1975; Neely, 2012). Affective 
priming, as a special case of semantic priming, is considered to be a demonstration that affective 
features are also representational constituents (Storbeck & Robinson, 2004). As such, these features 
were absent in initial semantic representation theories (e.g., Warrington & Shallice, 1984). Affective 
priming refers to the process by which the representation of a concept is facilitated by the prior 
processing of affectively congruent information, like a word, which is considered to activate a 
valence-processing node in the network (De Houwer, Hermans, Rothermund, & Wentura, 2002; 
Fazio, Jackson, Dunton, & Williams, 1995; Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell, & Kardes, 1986). For 
example, people are on average faster at identifying a positive word such as ‘love’ if this was 
immediately preceded a positive word like ‘plush’, as opposed to a more negative word as ‘knife’. 
Moreover, this facilitation, only obtained with shorter prime-target delays (for a review, see Klauer 
& Musch, 2003), is considered to be independent of any non-affective association between the prime 
words and the targets. Rather, it is thought to depend on automatic processing of the congruent 
affective features that the prime concept activates (De Houwer et al., 2002; Spruyt, Houwer, & 




influence compared to nonaffective relationships. This is the case of when affective features are made 
salient via task demands, like explicitly asking to focus on the affective content of a concept (e.g., 
Bargh, Chaiken, Govender, & Pratto, 1992; Bargh, Chaiken, Raymond, & Hymes, 1996; Klinger, 
Burton, & Pitts, 2000; Storbeck & Robinson, 2004). 
 
2.3 The neural correlates of affective features processing 
At the neurophysiological level, event-related potential (ERP) studies indicate that the mechanisms 
behind affective priming are similar to those of semantic priming, as suggested by the elicitation of a 
common N400 effect (Yao & Wang, 2014; but see also Herring, Taylor, White, & Crites, 2011). If 
we consider affective information as a type of semantic feature, this should not be surprising. 
Nevertheless, neuroimaging studies show the presence of both common and distinct networks 
implementing the two processes. In a study by Liu and colleagues (H. Liu, Hu, Peng, Yang, & Li, 
2010), the left middle frontal gyrus (MTG)/superior temporal gyrus (STG) have been found to be 
active in both types of priming, activity in the left inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) and in the STG was 
specific to semantic priming, and the left fusiform gyrus (FG) and insula were involved in affective 
priming. The common activation in the temporal cortex is in line with semantic theories indicating 
the area as supporting amodal conceptual processing (Lambon Ralph et al., 2016), while the left IFG 
has been repeatedly shown to be involved in semantic memory retrieval and selection (Moss et al., 
2005). The FG also finds an association with semantic processes in other studies, both for positive 
and negative affective information (Luo et al., 2004), whereas the insula is more commonly associated 
with subjective emotional responses (Amodio, 2014), but presents variations when it comes to the 
valence being processed, with the left part responding more strongly to negative than to positive 
stimuli (Lindquist et al., 2016). 
 Several of the areas involved in affective and nonaffective semantic priming are also active 




also been associated with both positive and negative social clues, like those concerning social group 
membership of individual faces, and has thus been proposed to support the processing of social threat 
and social reward (Amodio, 2014). The anterior insula is found to support the subjective experience 
of negative affect also when processing social stimuli, while the area involved in mentalizing and 
perspective taking, the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) more broadly, may be engaged more strongly 
towards ingroup (positive valence) than outgroup (negative valence) members (Gilbert, Swencionis, 
& Amodio, 2012). This latter region, receiving projections from the amygdala and insula, is also 
thought to support the integration of general affective processes with processes such as mentalizing 
and empathy. Such use of affective information for processes which are unique to social encounters, 
like mentalizing and empathy, does provide an initial indication of how affective information related 
to social stimuli may undergo distinct processes which do not take place when representing nonsocial 
concepts. 
 
2.4 Affective features as attitudes 
In absence of person-specific information, when it comes to evaluative judgments of other 
individuals, the main driving factor stems from the affective knowledge we have about the social 
group we associate that individual with. In the social psychological literature, this knowledge is 
defined as an attitude, and it is conceptualized as a subjective evaluation represented in memory that 
determines our positive or negative disposition towards others (Fazio et al., 1995, 1986; Greenwald 
& Banaji, 1995). The combined effects of categorization and evaluation makes it possible for attitudes 
to influence novel social encounters, as how people feel about a social group is generalized to all 
individuals identified as its members. In turn, it could be argued that the most salient valence 
information about individuals comes from their social groups. This affective trace in semantic 
memory does not necessarily require a prior interaction with the members of a social group. The 




parents (Castelli, Zogmaister, & Tomelleri, 2009) and through mass media (Tukachinsky, Mastro, & 
Yarchi, 2015) is enough for attitudes to be created. Based on the data conveyed by different sources, 
we start to link a social group with an affective evaluation. But whereas in social psychology the main 
‘attitude objects’ of interest are represented by people, they can also consist of any non-social entity, 
such as places, objects, or even abstract concepts, to which several of the same processes apply. The 
unanswered question is the extent to which the attitude towards different categories of concepts, as 
part of our knowledge about them, contributes to their representation, and whether such affective 
knowledge plays a special role when social groups are compared with nonsocial categories. 
 
 Introduction to the studies 
In the following chapters I will present three experiments designed to study how we process social 
and non-social categories and the role of affective semantic information. To achieve this aim, I will 
employ transcranial brain stimulation and neurophysiological recordings during semantic 
categorization and evaluation tasks. In particular, I will compare social groups and objects of different 
types, both on the positive and the negative side of the valence spectrum. As the extent of embodiment 
in semantics is still under debate, I will attempt to accommodate my findings within the multiple 
semantic models that argue for an affective processing modality. As this modality represents a 
meeting point between semantic and affective theories, its mechanisms are expected to follow those 
of what the latter theories described as semantic affect. The affective semantic component will thus 
be treated as having two dimensions, a positive and a negative one, each represented in distinct 
valence-specific areas at the level of the cortex (Lindquist et al., 2016). 
In Study 1 I will focus on the contribution of a frontal cortical area - the left inferior frontal 
gyrus - found to be involved in processing negative affective responses (Kensinger & Schacter, 2006) 
and damaged in patients showing semantic deficits for social groups (Piretti et al., 2015). The aim of 




categorization of names of social groups which are generally evaluated as more negative in 
comparison to more positively evaluated social groups, and to non-social categories overall. In Study 
2, while recording the corresponding neurophysiological signatures via electroencephalography 
(EEG), I will require participants to focus on the affective content of the same types of stimuli in 
order to provide an evaluative response during an affective priming paradigm. Here too, the 
comparison between social and non-social categories will involve the affective dimension, evaluating 
whether the brain response to positive and negative information changes based on the semantic 
category from which it is derived and on the affective congruency with prime words. In Study 3 I will 
apply multivariate pattern analyses (MVPA) on EEG data to measure the temporal dynamics of the 
brain in processing the affective content of social and non-social stimuli. In this study I will 
manipulate the modality of presentation of the stimuli, allowing to measure the activity of a cross-
modal neural substrate for processing affective knowledge of social groups. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Study 1: The Contribution of the Left Inferior Frontal 
Gyrus in Affective Processing of Social Groups 
 
This chapter is a modified version of the following paper: Suran, T., Rumiati, R. I., & Piretti, L. 
(2019). The contribution of the left inferior frontal gyrus in affective processing of social groups, 
Cognitive Neuroscience, 10:4, 186-195, DOI: 10.1080/17588928.2019.1593127 
 
Abstract 
We investigated the contribution of the pars opercularis of the left inferior frontal gyrus (LIFGop) in 
representing knowledge about social groups. We asked healthy individuals to categorize words 
preceded by semantically congruent or incongruent primes while stimulating the LIFGop. Previous 
studies showing an involvement of the LIFGop both in processing social stimuli and negative valence 
words led us to predict that its stimulation would affect responses to negative social category words. 
Compared to the Vertex as control site, the stimulation of the LIFGop increased the speed of 
categorization of negative social groups, and disrupted the semantic priming effect for negative words 
overall. Within the framework of recent theories of semantic memory, we argue that the present 
results provide initial evidence of the representation of social groups being characterized by affective 
properties, whose processing is supported by the LIFGop. 
 
 Introduction 
The study of neurological patients’ cognitive and affective abilities allows highlighting the underlying 
neural systems. Thus, brain damage has been shown to selectively and severely impair the ability of 
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individuals to name and recall detailed information about otherwise familiar people, leaving their 
semantic knowledge about objects or animals intact (e.g., Miceli et al., 2000; Thompson et al., 2004); 
or it can produce the reverse pattern, that is, impaired recognition of objects and animals with intact 
knowledge about people (Haslam & Sabah, 2013; Kay & Hanley, 2002; Lyons, Kay, Hanley, & 
Haslam, 2006; Thompson et al., 2004). These dissociations argue in favor of distinct brain systems 
for processing conspecifics and other non-social stimuli. However, the theories formulated to explain 
the category-specific deficits initially reported only among non-social categories have been a little 
silent on how concepts about conspecifics might be represented (for reviews, see Capitani, Laiacona, 
Mahon, & Caramazza, 2003; Caramazza, Anzellotti, Strnad, & Lingnau, 2014; Thompson-Schill, 
2003).  
Extant neuropsychological research has shown that patients’ failure to name/recognize 
famous people such as Ronald Reagan (Miceli et al., 2000; Thompson et al., 2004) is selectively 
limited to the individual identities, while their ability to recognize non-social entities remains intact. 
Nevertheless, the level of the information required for the successful recognition of individual 
conspecifics might be intrinsically different from the one required for recognizing non-social entities. 
Recently, Rumiati, Piretti and colleagues reported that some patients were selectively impaired at 
recognizing conspecifics when presented as social groups (e.g., doctors; Piretti et al., 2015; Rumiati, 
Carnaghi, Improta, Diez, & Silveri, 2014). This deficit is argued to originate at the semantic level as 
it has been observed when either sorting names of social groups (Rumiati et al., 2014) or naming 
images depicting them (Piretti et al., 2015). In the latter study, using voxel-based lesion-symptom 
mapping (VLSM), Piretti et al. (2015) documented tumor patients with lesions in regions associated 
also with affective processes such as insula, amygdala, basal ganglia, and inferior frontal gyrus, who 
were impaired at naming photographs of social groups. This association between damage to affective 
processing areas and recognition deficits involving social groups led us to hypothesize that successful 
recognition of such social categories may depend on an intact ability to process affective information. 
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As the recognition of living and non-living things primarily weights on sensory and functional 
properties respectively, we hypothesized that recognition of social groups might require a privileged 
access to affective properties. Indeed, compared with patients without the deficit and healthy controls, 
patients with dementia and semantic deficits for social groups expressed less extreme affective 
evaluations for both positive and negative social groups, an effect that is known as emotional blunting 
(Carnaghi et al., 2015).  
From a theoretical perspective, Barsalou and colleagues proposed that, in addition to the other 
sensory modalities, a model of conceptual knowledge should also include an emotion modality that 
is relevant for processing the affective properties of conceptual representations (Simmons and 
Barsalou, 2003; Barsalou, 2008). In their view, the internal affective states represent a component of 
knowledge that is as important as the external perceptual experience processed by other modalities 
(Barsalou, 2008). Thus, the patients’ deficit at recognizing social groups (Rumiati et al., 2014; Piretti 
et al., 2015) can be interpreted as being due to degraded affective properties that play a prominent 
role in their representation. Martin (2016) too suggested that the affective properties are stored in 
emotional systems, with affective information being a salient component of social concepts. An 
emotion modality is also present in the hub-and-spokes model proposed by Lambon Ralph and 
collaborators (Lambon Ralph, Jefferies, Patterson, & Rogers, 2016; Noonan, Jefferies, Visser, & 
Lambon Ralph, 2013; Patterson, Nestor, & Rogers, 2007; Rogers et al., 2004) whereby the conceptual 
representations result from integrating several, modality-specific areas or spokes – that process 
information related to sound, praxis, function, vision, valence, and verbal description – which in turn 
feed a central modality-independent module (the ‘hub’). Interestingly, the model predicts that 
impairments involving the representation of conspecifics may derive from damage to cortical areas 
that process valence (Lambon Ralph et al., 2016).  
As to the neural correlates, the pars opercularis of the left inferior frontal gyrus (LIFGop) 
singled out by Piretti et al (2015) is one of the candidates in which the affective processing of social 
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groups may take place. This area has also been found across several neuroimaging studies. First, the 
LIFGop is specifically involved in the semantic representation of familiar people when individual 
identities are categorized based on their profession at the level of social group (Chedid et al., 2016). 
Additionally, the LIFGop is one of the joint regions being active when healthy subjects read sentences 
describing behaviors of both individuals and social groups (Van der Cruyssen, Heleven, Ma, 
Vandekerckhove, & Van Overwalle, 2014). 
As to the involvement in the processing of affective information related to conspecifics, the 
LIFGop has been associated with both emotional empathic responses (Shamay-Tsoory, Aharon-
Peretz, & Perry, 2009), and in processing emotional facial expressions (Decety & Chaminade, 2003). 
Moreover, as the LIFGop is also part of Broca’s area, its damage has also been shown to impair 
linguistic processes linked to affect. Thus damage to this region impairs the retrieval of the names of 
the emotions conveyed by facial expressions (Adolphs, Damasio, Tranel, Cooper, & Damasio, 2000), 
while neuroimaging techniques repeatedly highlighted a link between LIFGop and the affective 
processing of words with a negative valence. For instance, the cortical activity in this area increases 
more when participants judge the animacy of words with negative valence than positive valence 
(Kensinger & Schacter, 2006; but see also Leclerc & Kensinger, 2011). Additionally, a greater 
LIFGop activation to negative than neutral or positive words has been recorded in working memory 
tasks with emotional word distractors (García-Pacios, Garcés, del Río, & Maestú, 2017). Last, the 
area is increasingly activated when subjects read sentences about negative social groups or an 
individual with a negative trait performing a negative behavior, compared to when positive behaviors 
are performed by positive social groups or individuals (Van der Cruyssen et al., 2014). In sum, the 
reviewed evidence suggests a key role of the LIFGop in both lexical and affective processing 
involving conspecifics. Based on the hypothesis that the representation of social groups relies on 
processing affective information, and that the LIFGop supports to a greater extent the processing of 
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negative words, this area might in turn be expected to support the representation of social groups with 
a negative valence.  
In the present study we applied transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) over the LIFGop 
when healthy participants performed a semantic priming task. In fact, there is a consensus that the 
contribution of an area to a category-specific representation can be established by applying TMS 
during a semantic priming task (e.g., Cattaneo, Devlin, Salvini, Vecchi, & Silvanto, 2010; Fuggetta, 
Rizzo, Pobric, Lavidor, & Walsh, 2009). The stimulation, by influencing the activity of an area based 
on the initial state of activation, should induce the same facilitatory effects in categorizing an 
unprimed target as if it was preceded by a congruent prime (Cattaneo, Rota, Vecchi, & Silvanto, 
2008). Consistently, we expected a smaller priming effect for social groups than for objects when 
stimulating the LIFGop, with no significant differences in RTs between congruent and incongruent 
trials containing social group targets. More specifically, this reduced difference should result from 
the categorization of social groups in incongruent trials targets becoming faster when stimulating the 
LIFGop relative to a control site, leaving the responses in congruent trials unaffected. Given the 
previously established link between the LIFGop and the processing of negative valence stimuli, we 
additionally expected to record stronger or unique effects for social group words associated with a 




Twenty participants (10 females, age range: 20 – 31 years) took part to the study for a monetary 
compensation. The inclusion criteria consisted in the absence of common contraindications to TMS 
(Rossi, Hallett, Rossini, & Pascual-Leone, 2009, 2011), speaking Italian as first language and self-
reported right-handedness. This study protocol was approved and carried out in accordance with the 
recommendations of the local Ethics Committee (2793/10), and in accordance with the Declaration 
of Helsinki. All subjects gave written informed consent prior to participating. 
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2.2 Materials 
Stimuli were selected from a dataset of 175 Italian plural related nouns of Objects (e.g., chiavi [keys]) 
and Social groups (e.g., studenti [students]). Ratings were collected from a sample of 14 participants, 
and were based on familiarity, imageability, and valence. The pool of selected stimuli consisted of 
30 nouns of Social groups and 30 nouns of Objects (see Appendix 1). The two categories were 
matched on word length, t(58) = 1.00. p = .34, familiarity t(58) = 1.53, p = .40, imageability, t(58) = 
-1.92, p = .06, and valence, t(58) = 1.00, p = .32. Additionally, each category was divided into two 
sub-samples of equal size based on their valence. Within each category, Positive (e.g., modelle 
[female models], gioielli [jewels]) and Negative words (e.g., alcolisti [alcoholics], pistole [guns]) 
were matched based on length (tSocial_Groups(28) = 1.19, p = .24; tObjects(28) =.34, p = .74), familiarity 
(tSocial_Groups(28) = 1.33, p = .19; tObjects(28) =.46, p = .64), and imageability (tSocial_Groups(28) = -.11, p 
= .91; tObjects(28) = .43, p = .67), but differed significantly in their valence (tSocial_Groups(28) = 9.48, p 
< .001; tObjects(28) = 11.22, p < .001; see Table 1). The words ‘PERSONE’ (people) and ‘OGGETTI’ 
(objects) were used as primes, with the former being treated as semantically congruent to Social 
groups, and the latter to Objects. Primes and targets were always presented in uppercase and 
lowercase, respectively, to make it easier for participants to distinguish between the two and reduce 
the likelihood of erroneously responding to the primes. 
Category Valence Imageability Familiarity Length 
Social 
   positive 
6.23 (.46) 7.03 (.42) 6.50 (1.12) 7.93 (1.79) 
Object 
   positive 
6.06 (.48) 7.36 (.83) 5.90 (1.33) 7.20 (1.47) 
Social 
   negative 
3.98 (.80) 7.04 (.38) 5.99 (.96) 7.13 (1.89) 
Object 
   negative 
3.45 (.76) 7.25 (.42) 5.69 (1.08) 7.00 (1.77) 
Table 1. Mean valence, imageability, and familiarity on a scale from 0 to 7 (0 = extremely low; 9 = extremely 
high) and average word length for each word category. Standard deviations reported within parentheses. 
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To assess whether there were significant differences between each target Category/Valence 
group in terms of their semantic relationship with the primes, we employed the Italian version of the 
snaut open online software (http://meshugga.ugent.be/snaut-italian-2/; Mandera, Keuleers, & 
Brysbaert, 2017) to extract their respective semantic distances, calculated based on word co-
occurrences in large text corpora. An ANOVA on the resulting values using Category and Valence 
as between factors and Congruence as within factor revealed only a significant main effect of 
Congruence [F(1, 56) = 45.73, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .45], characterized by a lower semantic distance for 
Congruent (M = .79, SD = .10), relative to Incongruent primes (M = .92, SD = .08), with all other 
effects being nonsignificant (all ps > .35). 
 
2.3 Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation 
Three-dimensional MRI data of each subject were co-registered to the volunteer’s cranium to provide 
a navigational template for the positioning of the TMS coil. The positioning was conducted with the 
Brainsight software (version 2.1.5; Rogue Research, Montreal Canada) connected to a Polaris Vicra 
Optical Tracking System (Polaris, Northern Digital, Ontario, Canada). The system tracked the coil’s 
position with respect to the head using a stereotactic camera, which senses both the coil and the 
reflectors located on a strap tied to the subject’s head. Stimulation sites were identified on each brain 
reconstruction based on macro-anatomical landmarks (nasion, inion, lateral canthi, and tragi), and the 
locations of the induced field and stimulation spots were displayed on the MRI data. LIFGop location 
was based on the findings of Piretti and colleagues (2015) through MNI coordinates (x = -48, y = 1, 
z = 15), whereas Vertex location was set manually as the midpoint between nasion and inion and 
between the tragi. 
Paired-pulse TMS was delivered via two 200² units connected to a 70 mm figure-of-eight coil 
through a BiStim2 module (Magstim Company, Whitland, UK). During the experiment, the coil was 
held by a mechanical arm. For the LIFGop, the coil was oriented with an angle of approximately 45° 
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from the nasion-inion line with the handle pointing inwards. For the Vertex, the coil was oriented 
tangentially to the scalp and perpendicular to the sagittal plane. The two pulses were separated by a 
100 ms interval (10 Hz), held to induce an inhibition of cortical activity (as in, Chen, Wassermann, 
Canos, & Hallett, 1997; Oshio et al., 2010; but see also Opie, Ridding, & Semmler, 2015; Shirota, 
Sommer, & Paulus, 2016), and delivered approximately every 6 seconds. 
 
2.4 Procedure 
Prior to positioning the coil, each participant’s resting motor threshold (RMT) was measured. The 
determination of the RMT was conducted via observed movement motor threshold estimation (OM-
MT; Pridmore, Fernandes Filho, Nahas, Liberatos, & George, 1998), defined as the percentage of 
total machine output (PTMO) of single-pulse stimulation over the left primary motor cortex (M1; ~5 
cm lateral from the Vertex) that evoked 5 out of 10 visible contralateral finger/hand motor responses. 
Stimulation intensity was then set to 90% of each subject’s RMT (M = 30.7, SD = 3.50). 
After positioning the coil over the target area, participants completed a semantic priming 
paradigm. A PC running E-Prime (version 2.1, Psychological Tools, Inc) controlled the presentation 
of the stimuli, the recording of responses, and the onset of the TMS pulses. Stimuli were projected 
on a white background via a 19” LCD monitor with resolution of 1280*1024 pixels and a screen 
frame rate of 60 Hz. During each trial, a fixation cross was presented for 500 ms, followed by the 
presentation of a prime word (50 ms). The prime was replaced by a blank screen (100 ms) that 
preceded the target which remained on the screen for 1500 ms, or until participants gave a response 
via button press (see Fig. 1). 
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Figure 1. Temporal progression of a trial containing a Positive Social group target preceded by the 
semantically congruent prime. Bolts indicate TMS pulse delivery, with the first pulse coinciding with the offset 
of the prime and the second with the onset of the target word, separated by a 100 ms interval. 
 
Within the task, the first TMS pulse was delivered at the offset of the prime, whereas the 
second one coincided with the onset of the target word. To avoid potential effects associated to the 
stimulation in the preceding trial, a 4000 ms inter-trial interval was used, making a single trial last up 
to a maximum of 6150 ms. Participants were instructed to just attend the first word (prime) and to 
categorize the second word (target) based on whether it represented a living or a non-living entity. 
The response was given via button press, with the category-button mapping counterbalanced across 
participants. Since the TMS was mainly targeted to a left-lateralized area, participants always 
responded using the index and middle fingers of their left hand. Before starting with the main task, 
participants were given 5 practice trials with a different sample of stimuli to familiarize with the task 
and the stimulation. During the main task, all target stimuli were presented twice in a random order, 
once with the semantically congruent, and once with the semantically incongruent prime. The 
resulting 120 trials were then split into two blocks of 60 trials each. After the first block, participants 
could take a short self-paced break, after which they continued by pressing a response button. The 
same procedure, lasting approximately 7 minutes, was completed by each participant twice, once per 
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stimulation site, with the order of the site being counterbalanced across participants. The experiment 
thus consisted of a 2 (Site: LIFG vs. Vertex) x 2 (Category: Social groups vs. Objects) x 2 (Valence: 
Positive vs. Negative) x 2 (prime-target Congruence: Congruent vs. Incongruent) within-subjects 
design, with response time (RT) as the dependent variable. Given the subjectivity of the valence 
ratings previously acquired, to check whether the present subjects considered the two semantic 
categories having an equal valence within each level of the pre-established Valence factor, we asked 
them to rate the valence of each word at the end of the session. 
 
2.5 Data analysis 
We used R (R Core Team, 2016) and lme4 (Bates, Mächler, Bolker, & Walker, 2015) to perform a 
linear mixed effects analysis using RTs as predicted variable and Site, Category, Valence, 
Congruence and their interactions as fixed effects. The model also controlled for the effects of item 
length, familiarity and imageability to improve the accuracy of the fixed effect estimates. Random 
intercepts for each item nested within each subject were used as random effects. Incorrect trials and 
trials with RTs greater than 2 SD from their average (629 ms, SD = 161) were filtered prior to analysis. 
To fix deviations from normality, as from visual inspection of residual plots, RT were transformed 
via reciprocal log-transformation. Following transformation, no visible deviations from normality we 
detected. P-values are reported using restricted maximum likelihood (REML) estimation and the 
Satterthwaite approximation to calculate the denominator degrees of freedom. Follow-up analyses to 
explore the significant interactions were conducted via an analysis of simple effects, with Bonferroni-
corrected contrasts between congruence and stimulation site conditions. The effects size of the 
contrasts were calculated using the Cohen’s d for repeated measures (Cohen’s dz; Lakens, 2013; 
Rosenthal, 1986). 
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As a manipulation check, to assess whether the subjects’ valence ratings coincided with the 
pre-determined Valence factor, we ran an ANOVA on the average valence ratings of the target words 
given at the end of the session, using Category and Valence as factors. 
 
 Results 
3.1 Main results 
The analysis revealed a significant main effect of Congruence [F(1, 3325) = 50.51, p < .001], with 
participants being overall slower on Incongruent trials compared to Congruent trials, and no 
significant main effects of Site [F(1, 3342) = 1.56, p = .21], Category [F(1, 1129) =.18, p = .67] and 
Valence [F(1, 1128) =.71, p = .40]. Two significant three-way interactions emerged between Valence, 
Category and Site [F(1, 3348) = 7.71, p = .006], and between Valence, Congruence and Site [F(1, 
3328) = 3.85, p = .05], but not a significant four-way Congruence x Category x Valence x Site 
interaction [F(1, 3329) = .01, p = .93]. To disentangle the Valence x Category x Site interaction, we 
tested how RTs to each Category were influenced by stimulation Site based on their valence. To do 
so, we ran two random effects models, one for each level of Valence, using Category and Site as fixed 
factors, controlling for imageability, length and familiarity. Random intercepts for Congruence nested 
within items and subjects were used as random effects. 
For Negative stimuli, the results showed a significant Site x Category interaction [F(1, 1147) 
= 7.19, p = .007]. Bonferroni-corrected contrasts addressing stimulation effects showed a significant 
effect for Social groups [t(1158) = -2.58, p = .03, Cohen’s d = -.58], with faster responses when 
stimulating the LIFGop compared with the Vertex, and no effect for Objects [t(1135) = 1.20, p = .68, 
Cohen’s d = .27] (see Figure 2). In addition, there was a significant difference in the stimulation effect 
between the two categories [t(1147) = 2.68, p = .02, Cohen’s d = .60]. As for the Positive stimuli, 
neither the interaction [F(1, 2150) = 1.58, p = .21], nor the main effect of Site [F(1, 2150) = .61, p = 
.43], or Category [F(1, 2150) = 1.58, p = .21], were observed. 
 




Figure 2. Mean RTs (ms) for Negative (left panel) and Positive targets (right panel) separated by stimulation 
site and Category. Relative to the Vertex, participants were significantly faster to respond to social groups of 
more negative valence when the LIFGop was being stimulated. Error bars represent ± 1 SE. 
 
To disentangle the Valence x Congruence x Site interaction, we tested how RTs in each 
Congruence condition were influenced by the stimulation Site based on whether they belonged to the 
Negative or Positive valence (see Figure 3). As for the previous interaction, we ran two random effects 
models, one for each level of Valence, using Congruence and Site as fixed factors, controlling for 
word imageability, familiarity and valence ratings. Random intercepts for items nested within 
categories and within subjects were used as random effects. 
The results for Negative stimuli showed a main effect of Congruence [F(1, 1679) = 12.60, p 
< .001], no significant effect of Site [F(1, 1686) = .97, p = .32], and a marginally significant Site x 
Congruence interaction [F(1, 1676) = 3.35, p = .07]. Bonferroni-corrected contrasts on priming 
effects (Congruent vs Incongruent trials) showed the presence of a significant priming during the 
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stimulation of the Vertex [t(1681) = 3.79, p < .001, Cohen’s d = .84], but not during the stimulation 
of the LIFGop [t(1673) = 1.22, p = .67, Cohen’s d = -.27]. For the Positive valence stimuli, the 
significant main effect of Congruence [F(1, 1647) = 40.35, p < .001], did not interact with the Site 
factor [F(1, 1654) = .96, p = .33]. 
 
Figure 3. Mean RTs (ms) for Negative (left panel) and Positive targets (right panel) separated by stimulation 
site and semantic congruence with the preceding prime. Error bars represent ± 1 SE. 
 
3.2 Manipulation check 
The analysis of the valence ratings showed a significant main effect of the pre-established Valence 
factor [F(1, 19) = 65.30, p < .001, 𝜂2  = .77], with positive valence words having higher ratings (M = 
6.29, SD = 1.07) compared to negative words (M = 4.26, SD = 1.20). The main effect of Category 
and the interaction between Category and Valence were not significant (both ps > .10). 
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3.3 Exploratory analysis 
We further explored the data to assess the extent to which the faster responses for Negative Social 
groups during LIFGop stimulation were driven by changes in RTs in Incongruent or Congruent trials 
relative to the Vertex. To this end, we ran Bonferroni-corrected contrasts for stimulation effects 
(Vertex vs. LIFG) on Incongruent and Congruent trials containing Negative Social groups or 
Negative Objects. 
For Negative Social groups, a significant effect of the stimulation emerged in Incongruent 
trials [t(1686) = -2.74, p = .01, Cohen’s d = -.61], but not in the Congruent ones [t(1687) = -.93, p = 
.71, Cohen’s d = -.21], indicating that the overall faster responses to Negative Social groups, and the 
same lack of a priming in the LIFGop stimulation condition, was mostly driven by faster responses 
to unprimed targets (see Figure 4). In the case of Negative Objects, no significant effects of 
stimulation were observed for either Incongruent [t(1677) = -.12, p = 1.00, Cohen’s d = -.03], or 
Congruent trials [t(1670) = 1.76, p = .15, Cohen’s d = .39]. 
 
Figure 4. Mean RTs (ms) for Incongruent (left panel) and Congruent (right panel) of negative valence divided 
by semantic category and site of stimulation. Error bars represent ± 1 SE. 
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 Discussion 
With the present study we aimed at assessing the role played by the LIFGop in representing social 
groups. This prediction was based on empirical facts and extant theories. First, brain-damaged 
patients were described with a selective deficit in processing social groups (Rumiati et al., 2014), and 
the LIFGop was identified as the underlying common cortical region associated with patients’ poorer 
naming performance on social groups (Piretti et al., 2015). Second, some theoretical propositions 
(Barsalou, 2008; Lambon Ralph et al., 2016; Martin, 2016) led us to hypothesize that the semantic 
representation of social groups might be better captured by affective properties, with the affective 
valence playing a critical role. Moreover, the observed association between LIFGop activity and the 
processing of negative valence words (García-Pacios et al., 2017; Kensinger & Schacter, 2006; 
Leclerc & Kensinger, 2011) suggested that this area might be specifically involved in representing 
social groups of negative affective valence. 
When TMS was applied over the LIFGop, relative to the Vertex, we found a significant 
decrease in RTs to negative social categories, with no effect for positive social categories or objects 
of any valence. In line with our hypothesis, we interpret this finding as an indication of a preferential 
involvement of the LIFGop, boosted by TMS, in the representation of social groups when processing 
negative affective attributes. An exploratory analysis also revealed that, when the stimulation was 
applied to the LIFGop (relative to the Vertex), the faster responses were mostly driven by lower RTs 
to unprimed trials. These findings, together with the unaltered responses to primed trials, are 
consistent with previous TMS studies on object representations, also reporting faster responses in 
unprimed trials (Cattaneo et al., 2010, 2008). According to the state-dependent hypothesis, the TMS 
effect on the target neuronal population in a state of lower activation (during the unprimed condition) 
should lead to an increased excitability and faster processing (Cattaneo et al., 2010, 2008; Silvanto, 
Muggleton, & Walsh, 2008). It is thus plausible that the overall facilitation we found in categorizing 
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negative social groups derives from a combination of the TMS-induced facilitation in incongruent 
trials and a stable priming effect in congruent trials. 
Additionally, our results have shown a disruption of the priming effect, which, contrary to our 
expectations, was not unique to social groups, but it was present for negative words in general, 
including objects. In the latter case, although not significant, the disruption of the priming was 
numerically mostly led by a decrease in RTs for primed object targets, contrary to what was found 
for social groups. If the LIFGop supports the activation of negative affective representations and these 
are more strongly linked to the processing of social groups, then an increase in its excitability through 
stimulation might have increased participants’ readiness to categorize a social group when reading a 
negative word regardless of its category. We hypothesize that such readiness might have produced a 
lag in the categorization of primed object targets. Although purely speculative, this idea is in line with 
electrophysiological studies suggesting the presence of effects driven by the affective content of 
words preceding and influencing later semantic processing (Kissler, Assadollahi, & Herbert, 2006). 
It is still not clear whether the involvement of the LIFGop might extend beyond accessing the 
existing social semantic knowledge. For instance, a recent TMS study failed to find a significant 
involvement in the formation of social impressions (Ferrari et al., 2016). However, unlike the present 
study, the possibility of a valence-specific effect was not considered by Ferrari and colleagues, 
suggesting that a possible contribution of this region in creating novel social impressions, especially 
for negative stimuli, is not to be excluded. To this end, it is worth noting that an fMRI study on 
impression formation from social behavioral descriptions reported an increased activation of the 
LIFGop when contrasting negative vs. positive social attributes (Van der Cruyssen et al., 2014). 
When it comes to accessing the representation of social groups, our findings support the 
hypothesis on the relevance of affective information, consistently with the proposal that social 
concepts are characterized by a predominance of affective properties (Piretti et al., 2015). This 
conclusion is consistent with the role of LIFGop in processing negative valence words (García-Pacios 
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et al., 2017; Kensinger & Schacter, 2006; Leclerc & Kensinger, 2011; Van der Cruyssen et al., 2014), 
and with multiple theorizations linking the processing of social concepts with affect (e.g., Lambon 
Ralph et al., 2016; Martin, 2016). Consistently with the Conceptual topography theory (Simmons & 
Barsalou, 2003), the present findings also support the distinction in processing of positive and 
negative affective features within the emotional modality, additionally suggesting the latter being 
implemented in the LIFGop. Finding the same pattern of results for positive words following the 
stimulation of an area involved in the processing of positive affective information would bring 
additional evidence in support of this distinction and of the hypothesis that social concepts rely on 
affective information. 
Our results are not easily accommodated within previous theories of emotion lateralization 
suggesting that the processing of negative affect is right-lateralized in the prefrontal regions 
(Davidson, 1992, 1995; Davidson & Irwin, 1999). Consistent with our findings, however, in a more 
recent neuroimaging study the affective processing of picture and word stimuli led to a bilateral 
activation of prefrontal lateral regions (Kensinger & Schacter, 2006). In the domain of language, 
Kensinger & Schacter (2006) found a greater activation for negative compared with positive words 
only in the LIFGop. Yet, our results do not exclude the possibility that also other areas might support 
the processing of social groups with a negative valence. We rather favor the idea that the LIFGop is 
part of a wider network of cortical and subcortical regions supporting affective and semantic 
processing, that in our study we might have affected indirectly with the stimulation. 
In conclusion, our data support the hypothesis of a predominant role of the LIFGop in 
affective processing of social groups. Confirming the previously evidenced involvement of the region 
in processing negative features, we suggest that its activation facilitates the processing of lexical 
stimuli that rely more heavily on such features. In this view, compared to the categorization of objects, 
the categorization of social group names is facilitated because their representation relies more on 
affective information than objects do. As such, our findings bring additional evidence to the 
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theoretical propositions that link semantic representations to affective processes (Barsalou, 2008; 
Lambon Ralph et al., 2016; Martin, 2016; Simmons & Barsalou, 2003) and suggest where in the brain 
this interplay is likely to take place. While a comparison with only the objects category poses a limit 
to the strength of our conclusions, we encourage future studies on the representation of social groups 
to replicate the present findings by taking into account comparisons with semantic categories such as 
animals. As previous research has argued objects and animals to be distinguished for the variety of 
their uses and of their visual properties, respectively, we argue that the factor playing a greater role 
in enabling us to discern among social groups is likely to be the affective valence we attribute to them. 
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CHAPTER 3 
Study 2: Electrophysiological Correlates of Social 
Group Representations in Affective Priming 
 
Abstract 
There is growing evidence in cognitive neuroscience that processing of information about social 
groups involves the associated affective features, compared with processing information about 
nonsocial semantic categories. With the present study we aimed at assessing the extent of such 
involvement by measuring event-related potentials in healthy individuals while they performed an 
affective priming paradigm requiring evaluative responses. Behavioral results showed a greater 
affective priming for social group than for nonsocial category targets, while the analysis of the neural 
correlates revealed a modulation in the late positive component, which was higher in the positive 
valence social groups as compared to positive valence nonsocial categories. The present findings 
complement previous neuropsychological and brain stimulation studies by showing how the 
engagement in affective processing enhances the representation of social groups compared to 




When we categorize our conspecifics into social groups based according to characteristics such as 
gender, ethnicity, social status or occupation, we rely on both semantic and affective information. For 
example, the label “criminals”, referred to people being guilty of crimes, comes together with its 
generally negative evaluation; likewise, the label “students”, in addition to informing us about the 
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young age of individuals that attend some type of educational system, would generally be attached to 
a positive evaluation. The semantic component informs us about the appearance and behavior of the 
group, whereas the affective one determines our attitude, a positive or negative disposition towards it 
(T. D. Wilson, Lindsey, & Schooler, 2000). The semantic and affective systems have often been 
regarded as being apart (Pessoa, 2008), however arguments for their interdependence have also been 
put forward. For instance, it has been suggested that affective information would be a core component 
of our conceptual knowledge as much as any other type of information, and that its relevance would 
differ depending on the semantic category (Barsalou, 2008; Lambon Ralph et al., 2016). In particular, 
some authors have proposed that the affective information largely contributes towards the 
representation of conspecifics (Lambon Ralph et al., 2016; Mahon & Caramazza, 2011; Martin, 
2016). Indeed, neuropsychological studies documented patients with a selective deficit at processing 
social groups, thus suggesting that concepts about them might have a representation of their own 
(Carnaghi, Silveri, & Rumiati, 2015; Rumiati, Carnaghi, Improta, Diez, & Silveri, 2014). Moreover, 
widespread tumor lesions in areas commonly linked to affective processes affected the patients’ 
accuracy at naming pictures of social groups (Piretti et al., 2015). What needs to be explained is the 
role played by valence in processing the affective information. Using transcranial magnetic 
stimulation on healthy subjects, the increased excitability of the inferior frontal gyrus, associated to 
the processing of negative valence stimuli, has been found to facilitate the categorization of negative 
social groups (Suran, Rumiati, & Piretti, 2019).  
To further assess the extent to which affective valence contributes to the semantic 
representation of social groups, we employed an affective priming paradigm (Fazio, 2001; Fazio, 
Sanbonmatsu, Powell, & Kardes, 1986). During the test, participants are shown either a positive or 
negative target word upon which they build an evaluative response. To influence their speed in 
evaluating the target, a prime word of the same or opposite valence is presented right before it, pre-
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activating an affective processing. The priming effect corresponds to faster responses to targets 
preceded by affectively congruent, relative to affectively incongruent primes. 
In order to establish the stage at which the primes influence the processing of the targets, we 
complemented the behavioral paradigm with the measurement of event-related potentials (ERPs). 
The two most studied components in affective priming are the N400 (~400 ms post-target onset) and 
the late positive component (LPC; ~600 ms post-target onset), whose effects emerge from their 
differences between congruent and incongruent trials. In this context, the former effect has been 
associated with the process of integrating the semantic content of primes and targets (Zhang, Lawson, 
Guo, & Jiang, 2006; Zhang, Li, Gold, & Jiang, 2010). The LPC, reported to be sensitive to word 
valence (for a review, see Citron, 2012), has been regarded to also capture affective prime-target 
incongruities and thus to be a more reliable index of affective priming when controlling for non-
affective prime-target relationships (Herring et al., 2011; Hinojosa, Carretié, Méndez-Bértolo, 
Míguez, & Pozo, 2009). 
In line with previous studies showing a facilitated response to manipulable object targets 
following sensory-motor priming (Labeye, Oker, Badard, & Versace, 2008; Myung, Blumstein, & 
Sedivy, 2006), at the behavioral level we expected that activating the processing of affective 
information would result in a facilitated response (i.e. shorter reaction time) to social groups. 
Moreover, such facilitation, if not specific to social groups, was expected be significantly greater 
when compared to the facilitation observed for non-social semantic categories. As there is yet no 
consensus concerning which ERP component should be more sensitive to affective priming, as in 
previous studies, we expected to find both an N400 (Zhang et al., 2006, 2010) and an LPC effect 
(Herring et al., 2011). Additionally, we expected these effects to be greater towards social category 
targets relative to nonsocial categories, reflecting their hypothesized stronger reliance on the affective 
features being primed. 
 
 




Twenty-six healthy right-handed participants, all Italian native speakers, were recruited from the local 
population in exchange of monetary compensation, and all gave written consent prior to participation. 
Because of the inability to obtain sufficient EEG data in three participants due to the presence of 
artefacts coming from excessive movement, these were excluded from the analysis, bringing the final 
sample to 23 participants (13 female, age range 19-29). The study was approved by the Ethics 
Committee of the International School for Advanced Studies (SISSA, Trieste) in accordance with the 
Declaration of Helsinky. 
 
2.2 Materials 
A total of 108 plural nouns of social categories (N = 54) and nonsocial categories (N = 54) were used 
as target stimuli after being selected from a larger database rated by a different sample of 12 subjects 
(see Appendix 2). Each semantic category was divided in a positive and negative subset of 27 
elements each, differing significantly in their valence ratings [Social positive vs. Social negative, 
t(52) = 20.66, p < .001; Nonsocial positive vs. Nonsocial negative, t(52) = 22.24, p < .001). 
Additionally, within each valence subset, social and nonsocial category nouns were matched 
according to their average ratings of valence [Social negative vs Nonsocial negative, t(52) = 1.32, p 
= .19; Social positive vs Nonsocial positive, t(52) = 1.34; p = .19), arousal [Social negative vs 
Nonsocial negative, t(52) = 1.54, p = .13; Social positive vs Nonsocial positive, t(52) = 1.56; p = .13], 
familiarity [Social negative vs Nonsocial negative, t(52) = 1.22, p = .23; Social positive vs Nonsocial 
positive, t(52) = .28; p = .78], and length [Social negative vs Nonsocial negative, t(52) = .71, p = .48; 
Social positive vs Nonsocial positive, t(52) = .98; p = .33] (see Table 1). A separate sample of 18 
words to be used as primes was obtained from the ANEW rated database of Italian words 
(Montefinese, Ambrosini, Fairfield, & Mammarella, 2014). These consisted of 9 positive and 9 
negative nouns and adjectives of significantly different valence [t(18) = 33.23, p < .001], and matched 
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according to their arousal [t(18) = .28, p = .78], familiarity [t(18) = .02, p = .98], length [t(18) = .86, 
p = .40], concreteness [t(18) = .24, p = .81]. The additional concreteness matching was done to 
account for the different effects of abstract and concrete prime words on affective priming (Yao & 
Wang, 2013). To this list of words, 9 strings of hash symbols (#) with an equal average length to the 
positive and negative words (5-8 elements) was added to serve as affectively neutral primes, bringing 
the total number of primes to 27. 
To ensure an equal semantic relationship between the prime words and each target 
Category/Valence group, we employed the Italian version of the snaut open online software 
(http://meshugga.ugent.be/snaut-italian-2/) to extract their respective semantic distances, calculated 
based on word co-occurrences in large text corpora via cosine similarities between semantic vectors 
(Mandera et al., 2017). A mixed ANOVA on the extracted values using Category and Valence as 
between factors and Congruence as within factor showed, as expected, a significant main effect of 
Congruence [F(1, 104) = 104.9, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .50] characterized by a lower semantic distance for 
Congruent relative to Incongruent primes, and an interaction between Congruence and Valence [F(1, 
104) = 13.05, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .11] with a greater distance between congruent and incongruent primes 
for negative, relative to positive words. 




   Positive 
27 6.24 (.48) 4.11 (.42) 4.02 (1.11) 7.19 (1.24) .03 (.04) 
Nonsocial 
   Positive 
27 6.41 (.45) 3.90 (.56) 3.94 (1.13) 6.82 (1.52) .03 (.04) 
Social 
   Negative 
27 3.06 (.64) 3.93 (.50) 3.10 (.88) 7.30 (1.54) .05 (.05) 
Nonsocial 
   Negative 
27 3.28 (.58) 3.73 (.48) 2.81 (.86) 7.00 (1.52) .06 (.04) 
Table 1. Mean valence, arousal and familiarity ratings (0 = extremely low; 7 = extremely high), average word 
length, and difference in the semantic distance (cosine) with the congruent and incongruent primes for each 
target word category separated by valence class. Standard deviations reported within parentheses. 
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2.3 Procedure 
Participants performed the affective priming task in a dark and acoustically insulated room. The task 
required to evaluate a target word preceded by a prime of the same or opposite valence. Instructions 
were provided to the participants in both written and oral form by the experimenter. Prior to the task 
proper, participants completed a set of 20 practice trials containing a different set of primes and 
targets. To ensure the task had been understood, participants had to undergo 20 additional practice 
trials in a newly randomized order if they had responded incorrectly to more than practice 5 trials. 
Each trial began with the presentation of a fixation cross (500 ms), after a 200 ms interval, the prime 
(150 ms) and the target (300 ms) appeared, separated by a 100 ms ISI (see Figure 1). After the offset 
of the target, participants were presented with a blank screen during which they had an additional 
1500 ms to give their evaluation via button press. Following this period, or after pressing a button, 
the blank-screen intertrial interval was jittered between 800 and 1200 ms (in 100 ms intervals). To 
respond, participants pressed either the “f” or the “j” key on a QWERTY keyboard, with “positive” 
and “negative” response mapping counterbalanced across participants. Key-choice was driven by the 
presence of dash-like bumps allowing for easier identification in the dark room. To help participants 
differentiate primes from targets, the primes were always presented in uppercase and targets in 
lowercase format. Additionally, to ensure words with equal length subsided an equal amount of visual 
angle, all word stimuli were presented in Lucida Sans Typewriter monospaced font, thus making the 
amount of horizontal space occupied by each character the same. 
Participants completed 324 test trials split in 12 equal blocks. The breaks between blocks were 
self-paced. The 108 targets were presented three times, each time paired with a prime of different 
valence. To avoid two same targets appearing too close to one-another, prime-target pairs were 
presented in a pseudo-random order. Only after all targets had been presented once in a random order, 
they were presented for the second time in a new order, and the same was done for the third 
presentation. Within each of the 3 resulting cycles of 108 trials, the order of the appearance of each 
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prime-target pair was randomized. The task was programmed in Python using the Psychopy library 
(Peirce, 2007), and lasted approximately 25 minutes. 
 
Figure 1. Schematic representation of the affective priming task depicting an affectively congruent trial. 
Stimuli succession is represented left to right, with the respective screen presentation time expressed in 
milliseconds below each stimulus. The last blank display represents the intertrial interval with a jittered 
duration between 800 and 1200 ms in 100 ms intervals. 
 
2.4 Behavioral data analysis 
Behavioral data were preprocessed and analyzed in R (R Core Team, 2016). Subjects whose overall 
accuracy was lower than 80% were excluded from further analyses (n = 3). On the remaining 20 
subjects, the average accuracy score was subjected to a 2 (Category: Social vs. Nonsocial) x 2 
(Valence: Positive vs. Negative) x 3 (Congruence: Congruent vs. Incongruent vs. Neutral) repeated 
measures ANOVA. The same model was then applied to the log-transformed RTs following the 
removal of incorrect trials and trials in which RTs deviated by more than 2 SD from each subject’s 
average (14% of the total trials). As a measure of effect size we used partial eta squared. Post-hoc 
tests for significant higher order effects were calculated as planned contrasts on priming effects 













800 - 1200 
blank 
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2.5 EEG recordings and data analysis 
EEG was recorded with a set of 64 Ag/AgCl active electrodes mounted on an elastic cap based on the 
International 10-20 system (Klem, Lüders, Jasper, & Elger, 1999). Signal amplification was achieved 
through a BioSemi Active-Two amplifier system. During recording data were visualized and stored 
by means of ActiView acquisition software (ActiView 707, Biosemi, Amsterdam, The Netherlands). 
Electrode offsets were kept between ±20 mV, and the signal was sampled at a rate of 1024 Hz, with 
a 24-bit digitization resolution. A common mode voltage based on the ActiveTwo’s CMS/DRL 
feedback loop was used for analog-to-digital conversion of recorded voltages for each electrode (cf. 
to https://www.biosemi.com/faq/cms%26drl.htm). Data were band-pass filtered between 0.01–100 
Hz during data acquisition. To monitor eye movements and blinks, horizontal and vertical 
electrooculogram (EOG) was recorded via four additional electrodes placed at the outer canthi of 
both eyes, and below and above the left eye. 
EEG data preprocessing was performed using the Brainstorm software (Tadel, Baillet, 
Mosher, Pantazis, & Leahy, 2011) and subsequently analyzed in R (R Core Team, 2016) using the 
erpR package (Arcara & Petrova, 2014). First, the EEG recordings were resampled offline at 250 Hz 
and band-pass filtered (0.05 – 40 Hz). Bad electrode channels were removed upon visual inspection, 
as well as movement artefacts. Eye blinks artifacts were removed through independent components 
analysis (ICA; Makeig, Bell, Jung, & Sejnowski, 1996). Epochs containing artefacts other than eye 
movements were removed after visual inspection. Average ERPs were computed separately for each 
participant, electrode, target category/valence combination from -200 to +1500 ms relative to the 
onset of the target, and baseline-corrected using the 200 ms pre-stimulus period. 
To identify the time windows for the N400 and the LPC components and avoid the issue of 
circularity in windows selection, we used the collapsed localizer approach (Luck & Gaspelin, 2017) 
and the examination of existing literature. Both for the N400 (480 – 680 ms) and the LPC (700 - 900 
ms), the waves collapsed across all conditions were used. For the respective components, the time 
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regions surrounding the greatest peak amplitudes were selected. Four symmetrical regions of interest 
(ROIs; see Fig. 2) were then created by averaging the amplitude of the respective electrodes selected 
based on a visual inspection of the scalp topography of collapsed conditions in the relevant time 
windows previously obtained. Each of the four ROIs represented a combination of Caudality (frontal 
vs. posterior) and Laterality (left vs. right). 
The resulting ERPs were subjected to two 2 (Category: Social vs. Nonsocial) x 2 (Valence: 
positive vs. negative) x 2 (Congruence: congruent vs. incongruent) x 2 (Caudality: frontal vs. 
posterior) x 2 (Laterality: left vs. right) repeated measures ANOVAs, one for each component’s time 
window. Follow-ups to significant interactions consisted of Bonferroni-corrected contrasts of priming 
effects. Interactions that involved spatial factors (Caudality or Laterality) were followed up within 
each level. The aim of our study was to assess the effects of affective congruence across categories, 
thus, consideration is exclusively given to the contrasts concerning the interactions between affective 
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Figure 2. Scalp regions used for electrode grouping for statistical analyses of event-related potentials. 
 
 Results 
3.1 Behavioral results 
The analysis of the RTs showed a significant main effect of Congruence [F(2, 38) = 8.76, p < .001, 
𝜂𝑝
2 = .32] and a significant interaction between Category and Congruence [F(2, 38) = 3.88, p = .03, 
𝜂𝑝
2 = .17]. All other main effects and interactions were not significant (p > .1). Follow-up analyses on 
the Congruence effect revealed a significant difference between the Congruent and Neutral condition 
[t(38) = 3.48, p < .01], and between the Congruent and Incongruent condition [t(38) = 3.76, p < .01], 
whereas between the Incongruent and Neutral conditions there was no significant difference [t(38) = 
-.30, p > .05]. In the interaction, a significant difference between Congruent and Incongruent trials 
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(i.e., the priming effect) was observed for Social groups [t(38) = 4.65, p < .001] but not for Nonsocial 
categories [t(38) = 1.87, p = .38]. This difference was significantly greater for Social groups relative 
to Nonsocial categories [t(38) = -2.78, p = .05]. 
 
 
Figure 3. a) Violin plots with reaction times (ms) to target words based on the affective congruence with the 
preceding prime. Congruent trials are faster relative to Incongruent and Neutral trials, indicating the presence 
of a facilitation of the affectively congruent primes. b) Priming effect, calculated as the difference between 
Incongruent and Congruent trials, for Social and Nonsocial targets. Social groups showed a greater affective 
priming effect following the same primes. Error bars represent ±1 SE. 
 
3.2 ERP results 
480 – 680 ms. This time interval encompassed a negative-going wave, peaking around 600 
ms, interpreted by previous authors using an analogous paradigm as reflecting the N400 (Zhang et 
al., 2006). Although the results revealed a significant interaction between the factors of Category, 
Valence, and Congruence [F(1, 19) = 6.85, p = .017, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .26], post-hoc analyses did not show 
significant categorical differences based on Congruence for targets of either Valence (both ps > .05). 
700 – 900 ms. The analysis of the later time-window also revealed a significant 3-way 
interaction between Category, Valence and Congruence [F(1, 19) = 7.25, p = .01, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .28] which in 
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turn interacted also with Caudality [F(1, 19) = 6.57, p = .02, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .26]. Post-hoc Bonferroni-corrected 
contrasts showed a higher LPC for Congruent as compared to Incongruent trials for Positive Social 
group targets in the anterior electrode clusters [t(89) = -3.09, p = .008], which was not significant in 
the posterior clusters [t(89) = -2.21, p = .09]. Only in the anterior electrodes, this difference between 
Congruent and Incongruent trials for Social group targets was also significantly greater than the one 
for Nonsocial targets [t(89) = 2.70, p = .03]. No other LPC effects were observed (all ps > .05). An 
exploratory analysis of the anterior clusters motivated by the visual inspection of the scalp distribution 
of the LPC effect for Social groups (see Figure 4b) has shown that a marginally significant effect over 
the left electrodes [t(104) = -2.43, p = .05], and a significant effect over the right electrodes [t(104) = 
-3.50, p = .002], leading to a significant difference between Social and Nonsocial categories only over 
the right anterior cluster [t(48) = 2.87, p = .02]. Again, no LPC effect was found for Nonsocial targets 
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Figure 4. a) Grand average ERP waveforms of the right anterior electrode cluster divided by congruent (blue 
lines) and incongruent trials (red lines) for social groups (left column) and objects (right column) of positive 
valence (top row) and negative valence (bottom row). Only social groups of positive valence presented a 
significant priming effect in the LPC time window. Colored bands represent ±1 SE of the respective grand 
averages. b) Following the same disposition, topographic maps of the difference in amplitude between 
congruent and incongruent trials in the 700-900 ms time window for all conditions. 
 
 Discussion 
Processing affective features has been proposed to contribute to the semantic representation of 
conspecifics at the level of social groups (Piretti et al., 2015; Rumiati et al., 2014). The present study 
aimed at testing this claim by assessing whether priming affective information facilitates an 
evaluative response towards social groups relative to objects. To achieve this aim, we tested the 
hypothesis that deciding whether the name of a social group is positive or negative, compared to that 
of an object, is faster following the presentation of semantically unrelated but affectively congruent 
positive and negative primes. The behavioral data supported the hypothesis that participants would 
b) 
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show a significant affective priming effect for social group names regardless of their valence, but not 
for objects. The priming effect was mostly driven by faster evaluative responses to affectively 
congruent targets (i.e., positive priming), compared with incongruent and neutral conditions, while 
no difference was observed between these two. 
As argued in previous priming studies, the facilitation found could be due to congruent primes 
inducing a greater motor readiness to press the corresponding response key (Damian, 2001), rather 
than being the result of a spreading of activation within an affective/semantic network (De Houwer 
& Randell, 2002; Fazio, 2001; Spruyt, Hermans, Houwer, & Eelen, 2002). However, the presence of 
a categorical difference in the magnitude of the affective priming effect allows us to dismiss this 
interpretation of the findings. As the response priming might have partially driven the main priming 
effect by facilitating congruent motor responses, we argue that the categorical difference is likely to 
have emerged from an unequal spreading of activation in the affective/semantic network, from which 
social groups received a greater benefit. In addition, our findings allow us to argue that the spreading 
of activation in such network is not the same for all concepts, but it applies to some concepts more 
than to others, and might depend on the relevance of the affective features for their representation: 
this argument would explain why social group targets benefit from this spreading of activation more 
than the nonsocial category targets do. On the other hand, the lack of an affective priming effect for 
nonsocial category targets is in accordance with previous reports failing to find such effect with 
concrete words, mostly denoting object names (Yao & Wang, 2013; but see also De Houwer & 
Randeil, 2002). 
As to the ERP findings, we observed a significant category- and valence-specific effect for 
positive social groups in the 700-900 ms time window, with congruent trials eliciting a greater 
positivity relative to incongruent trials in the right-frontal region. This finding is however not in line 
with previous affective priming studies, reporting a greater amplitude in the incongruent condition 
from an LPC, and associating it with affective integration (Herring et al., 2011). In particular, the 
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scalp distribution of the effect suggests a it may reflect a different late right frontal component. Taking 
also into account its latency, the effect may indicate a sustained post-retrieval processing, indeed 
previously attributed to a greater motivational relevance of emotional stimuli (Ally & Budson, 2007; 
Van Strien, Langeslag, Strekalova, Gootjes, & Franken, 2009). This increased processing for positive 
social groups may have thus been triggered by the presentation of the preceding positive primes. To 
this end, the effect could also be interpreted as an anticipated late peak for primed as opposed to 
unprimed positive social groups. Both interpretations would be in line with previous findings 
suggesting that positive primes facilitate associative processes by increasing accessibility to 
associations (Storbeck & Clore, 2005). Social groups might thus receive a greater benefit from such 
increase in the affective semantic domain. 
In line with recent studies showing that the absence of a strong modulation of the semantic 
relationship between primes and targets does not elicit N400 effects (Herring et al., 2011), we failed 
to find a significant affective priming in the N400 time window. Although the congruent primes were 
semantically closer to the targets compared to incongruent primes, this difference may have indeed 
not been enough pronounced, suggesting that the results mostly reflect a modulation of the affective 
relationship between targets and primes, rather than a semantic one. This claim is also supported by 
the presence of a significantly stronger effect for social relative to nonsocial targets, despite the two 
categories not differing in their semantic distance from the congruent and incongruent primes. It is 
also worthy to mention that the lack of such significant effect could be simply related to statistical 
reasons. Even if an effect is true, as an N400 in affective priming may be, it is not expected to be 
replicated in every experiment (Lakens & Etz, 2017). 
An additional explanation as to why we found no effect for negative social groups in both 
ERP components, despite the presence of a behavioral effect, could be associated to differences in 
familiarity between positive and negative targets. Since the target semantic category matchings were 
conducted within each valence, it is possible that the expected effects for negative social categories 
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did not emerge because of the overall lower familiarity of negative nouns (see Table 1). Previous 
studies indeed showed that ERP effects are influenced by familiarity in priming paradigms (Voss, 
Lucas, & Paller, 2010). Even if this was the reason for the lack of an effect for negative social groups, 
the lack of an equivalent LPC effect for positive nonsocial categories still allows us to argue in favor 
of a greater reliance on affective features by positive social groups. 
The greater influence of affective priming towards social groups could be also explained by 
their relatively greater ratings of abstractness. Indeed, the same claim about a greater reliance on 
affective features has also been attributed to more abstract words in general because of the lack of a 
sensory component (Kousta, Vigliocco, Vinson, Andrews, & Del Campo, 2011; Vigliocco et al., 
2014). Although social groups are on average rated as relatively more abstract than objects, first, there 
is no indication of the presence of a direct correlation with a word’s abstractness and its reliance on 
affective processes, and second, they do not qualify as abstract words, as they do not lack sensory 
properties. Indeed, social group names as concrete stimuli are also found in several studies assessing 
the differences between the affective processing of abstract and concrete concepts (e.g., Newcombe, 
Campbell, Siakaluk, & Pexman, 2012; Yao et al., 2016; Yao & Wang, 2013). Moreover, if the greater 
reliance on affective features would be explained by an increased abstractness, we would expect 
patients showing deficits for abstract concepts to also be impaired in processing social groups, and 
vice versa, however, we are not aware of studies examining such dissociation. To clarify this issue, 
we suggest that future studies should employ equally representative pictures depicting social groups 
and objects as target stimuli, and test whether the same differences in affective priming emerge. 
In conclusion, by showing a facilitated access to the affective component of their semantic 
representation following affective priming, we can support the claim that representation of 
conspecifics relies to a greater extent on the processing of affective features (Piretti, 2017; Rumiati 
et al., 2014). These results contribute to explaining previous findings associating the damage and 
stimulation of areas commonly involved in processing affective information with the specific 
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representation of social groups (Piretti et al., 2015; Suran, Rumiati, et al., 2019). Although the reason 
and the nature for such reliance is still debated (Meteyard et al., 2012), we propose that the greater 
association with affective processing when representing social groups could derive from the repeated 
engagement in empathetic (Barsalou, 2008) and evaluative responses (Piretti et al., 2015) when the 
meaning of these concepts is acquired and rehearsed. 
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CHAPTER 4 
Study 3: Temporal dynamics of cross-modal affective 
representations in social and nonsocial categories 
 
Abstract 
Affective features have been suggested to play a predominant role in social group representations. 
Although studies identified overlaps between affective processing regions and social groups 
representations, not much is known about the temporal dynamics of their interaction. In the present 
study, I used multivariate decoding of electroencephalography (EEG) data from an evaluative task to 
track affective representations as a function of stimulus semantic category. Pattern classifiers were 
trained at distinguishing between positive and negative valence concepts presented as words and then 
tested on the same concepts presented as pictures. In contrasting performance between social groups 
and objects, the results revealed a stronger affective decoding for social groups in both an early and 
late time windows, coinciding with delayed evaluative responses. The present findings provide initial 
evidence of the presence of categorical differences in affective temporal dynamics, and point to an 
increased complexity in social group affective/semantic representations. 
 
 Introduction 
Human lesion studies suggest that social categories such as social groups might be represented in an 
independent brain network from non-social categories (Piretti et al., 2015; Rumiati et al., 2014). 
Moreover, differently from nonsocial categories, the representation of social groups seems to give 
affective features a significantly greater weight. In a TMS study, we recently provided evidence that 
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stimulating the inferior frontal gyrus, commonly associated with the processing of negative affective 
features, speeds up the categorization of negative social group names. That is, when participants were 
presented with negative social group names such as “butchers”, as opposed to the positive category 
of “musicians”, TMS speeded up categorization responses to the former, thus suggesting a link 
between affective processing and semantic processing (Suran, Rumiati, et al., 2019). Moreover, using 
an affective priming paradigm, we found greater facilitation in evaluating social groups relative to 
objects following the presentation of semantically unrelated but affectively congruent primes. This 
suggests that the elaboration of affective information enhances the subsequent processing of social 
groups (Suran, Arcara, Piretti, & Rumiati, 2019). This set of findings is consistent with theories of 
semantic memory positing a central role of affective features in the representation of social groups 
(Lambon Ralph et al., 2016; Mahon & Caramazza, 2011; Simmons & Barsalou, 2003). As for how 
this central role of affect may be implemented anatomically, previous neuroimaging studies identified 
activation in regions selectively responding only to affective information related to social groups, as 
well as areas responding to both social groups and nonsocial categories but showing an increased 
response to the former (Norris et al., 2004). Even within regions processing both types of concepts, 
it is possible that the greater weight of affective information for social groups may be also reflected 
in the temporal dynamics of its processing, an aspect that fMRI, given its relatively low temporal 
resolution may have been unable to capture. To overcome such limitation, in the present study we 
used the temporal resolution of electroencephalography (EEG) to study whether differences between 
social and non-social are present in the temporal dynamics of processing their affective features. 
Additionally, to control for possible confounds of modality-specific mechanisms, we investigated the 
neural correlates of affective processes common to both visual and lexical inputs. 
According to one conceptualization of how semantic knowledge might be organized in the 
brain, affective features are independent from features that rely on other modalities (Lambon Ralph 
et al., 2016). A first characteristic of affective features is that they do not possess a dedicated input 
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modality. This implies that, to study affect, one needs to rely on stimuli, such as words or pictures, 
which, despite eliciting the same affective processes, are also expected to rely on distinct modality-
specific brain regions. For this reason, if one were to identify differences between two categories in 
affective features processing, it is often not possible to rule out the possibility that the difference is 
due to other properties of the stimulus, such as visual features in pictures that cannot be fully matched 
(Fairhall & Caramazza, 2013; Leonardelli, Fait, & Fairhall, 2019). By jointly using the information 
from two distinct input modalities, multivariate pattern analysis (MVPA) of neural information 
allows to overcome this limitation by individuating cognitive processes that are shared by different 
input modalities via cross-decoding (Grootswagers, Wardle, & Carlson, 2017; King & Dehaene, 
2014). To this end, for each time point from the target word onset, a classifier was trained to 
distinguish valence-dependent neural patterns, and then tested on recognizing them in pictures 
representing the same concepts (King & Dehaene, 2014). Each classifier trained on words was tested 
on all time intervals from picture presentation, lasting up to 1 second post stimulus-onset. The 
resulting time generalization analysis allowed us to study the changes in valence-specific brain 
patterns, and to directly compare them between word and picture targets in the temporal domain (King 
& Dehaene, 2014). To this end, we asked participants to complete an evaluative task in which they 
were required to explicitly focus on the affective content of the stimuli while their brain responses 
were being recorded. 
Affect-driven effects common to both words and pictures have been reported before in early 
and late time windows in studies adopting univariate analysis approaches. For example, singling-out 
negative information (associated with reactions to threat) can occur as early as in the 165-195 ms 
time window after target word onset (D. Zhang et al., 2014), while a later time window (~450 ms 
post-stimulus) has been argued to reflect the automatic processing of the polarity of affectively 
charged words (D. Zhang et al., 2014), the presence of an affective content of greater arousal 
(Hinojosa, Carretié, Valcárcel, Méndez-Bértolo, & Pozo, 2009), as well as the start of a more 
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controlled, context-dependent processing of affective information (Cunningham, Espinet, Deyoung, 
& Zelazo, 2005). In studies using picture stimuli, the presence of valenced as opposed to affectively 
neutral content is found in an early (150-180 ms) time window, whereas the affective polarity of such 
stimuli, as for words, is evidenced by a later component (~450 ms, Zhu et al., 2015). If such temporal 
and activation similarities reflect the involvement of shared underlying processes, we expected to 
record modality-independent valence effects both in early (~150 ms) and later time windows (~450 
ms). Based on the hypothesized interaction between the semantic category and affective processing, 
we expected an earlier and better modality-independent decoding when processing social compared 




Twenty-one healthy participants (16 females, age range: 21 – 33 years) took part to the study for 
monetary compensation. The inclusion criteria consisted in speaking Italian as first language, self-
reported right-handedness, and a minimum of 95% conformity in evaluating the target word stimuli 
according to the valence manipulation based on an online survey. The study protocol was approved 
and carried out in accordance with the recommendations of the local Ethics Committee, and in 




A total of 40 nouns of social groups (N = 20) and objects (N = 20) was selected from a larger database 
rated by a different sample of 12 subjects and used as target word stimuli. Each semantic category 
was equally split in a positive and negative subset of 10 elements each, differing significantly in their 
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valence ratings (see Appendix 3). Within the positive and the negative valence stimuli, social group 
and object nouns were matched according to their average ratings of valence, arousal, familiarity, and 
length (see Table 1). 
To exclude the possibility of categorical differences in RTs being due to differences in valence 
ambivalence (Cunningham et al., 2004) - as participants might take longer at considering both 
positive and negative features - we also administered an additional online survey to 40 participants 
(33 females, age range: 21-35). The survey presented participants with the target stimuli in a random 
order and asked to rate on a 9-point Likert scale the degree of both the positivity and negativity of 
each concept (0 = not at all, 9 = very much).To calculate ambivalence from the survey data, we 
computed for each concept an index of ambivalence using the equation of the Gradual Threshold 
Model (Priester & Petty, 1996) and subjected it to a 2 (Category: Social vs. Nonsocial) x 2 (Valence: 
Positive vs. Negative) ANOVA. The analysis of the resulting ambivalence scores revealed no effect 
of Category [F(1, 36) =.60, p = .44, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .02], a main effect of Valence [F(1, 36) = 44.71, p < .001, 
𝜂𝑝
2 = .55], with negative concepts being overall more ambivalent, and no significant interaction [F(1, 
36) = 3.03, p = .09, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .08]. 
A sample of 40 pictures representing the same concepts expressed by the selected words was 
retrieved from Google Images and matched across category and valence polarity in their 
representativeness ratings, collected from a different sample of 14 participants (see Table 1). Where 
applicable, the faces of the depicted individuals were manually blurred using the GIMP 2 software 
(Kimball, Mattis, Natterer, & Neumann, 2013). Additionally, pictures were also matched in low-level 
visual features (all ps > .05). These included average luminance, amount of red, green and blue, and 
average spatial frequency, extracted through a custom Matlab script (adapted from Blechert, Meule, 
Busch, & Ohla, 2014). 
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Variables Valence Arousal Familiarity Length Ambivalence Pic. represent. 
Social 
   Positive 
6.14 ± .71 3.91 ± .62 3.46 ± 1.02 7.4 ± 1.17 1.82 ± 2.06 6.69 ± .26 
Object 
   Positive 6.42 ± .47 4.00 ± .69 3.8 ± 1.04 6.8 ± 1.48 0.45 ± 1.01 6.64 ± .16 
Social 
   Negative 
3.30 ± .81 3.88 ± .57 3.63 ± .75 7.9 ± .52 4.50 ± 2.10 6.64 ± .27 
Object 
   Negative 3.07 ± .48 3.81 ± .57 2.94 ± 1.13 7.1 ± 1.52 5.03 ± 1.44 6.70 ± .20 
ANOVA p < .001 p = .92 p = .26 p = .37 p = .09 p = .87 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics for selected words and pictures, divided the combination of semantic category 
and valence polarity. Means of word length and ratings of valence (1, unpleasant to 7, pleasant), arousal (1, 
not arousing to 7, very arousing), familiarity (1, unfamiliar to 7, familiar), ambivalence, and of picture 
representativeness (1, not representative to 7, very representative). On the bottom row, p-values of one-way 
ANOVAs on each factor, using as independent variable the combination of category and valence polarity. 
 
To ensure an equal speed in semantic access between categories, we collected a measure of 
accessibility by devising a simple categorisation task. In this task, an independent sample of 20 
participants (11 females, age range: 25-35) was asked to provide speeded responses to the selected 
stimuli. The task required to categorize the targets based on whether they represented people or 
objects, using the same timings of the main task (see Fig. 1). The analysis of the reaction times showed 
no main effect of category [F(1, 19) =.53, p = .48, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .03], for which participants took on average 
the same time to categorize social groups and objects, regardless of modality and valence (both ps > 
.05). 
2.3 Procedure 
Following the montage of the EEG cap, participants were seated in an acoustically isolated room and 
asked to fixate an “X” in the center of the screen for 3 minutes to record resting-state EEG activity. 
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After this period, they completed an evaluative requiring to indicate via button press whether the 
concept represented by the target stimulus was associated with a pleasant or unpleasant feeling. A PC 
running PsychoPy (Peirce, 2007) controlled the presentation of the stimuli and the recording of 
responses. Stimuli were projected on a gray background via a 19” LCD monitor with resolution of 
1280*1024 pixels and a screen refresh rate of 60 Hz. During each trial, a fixation cross was presented 
for 700 ms, followed by a 200 ms blank screen and by the presentation of the target stimulus (300 
ms). The target was then replaced by another blank screen that lasted for 1700 ms, giving participants 
a total of 2000 ms to respond from target onset (see Figure 1). The evaluation was given via button 
press by using the index finger of each hand placed over the ‘f’ and ‘j’ QUERTY keyboard buttons. 
The intertrial interval (ITI) was jittered between 800 and 1200 ms at 100 ms intervals, and presented 
a white fixation cross on a gray background. Participants were instructed to try to restrict their 
blinking to the ITI period to reduce the number of artefacts. The target stimuli consisted of images or 
words representing social groups or objects of positive or negative valence, presented in a random 
order. Participants first completed a block of 10 practice trials, followed by 12 test blocks of 40 trials 
each. Single blocks contained either pictures of words in an alternating, counterbalanced order, and 
were separated by self-paced breaks. 
The experiment consisted of a 2 (Category: social group vs. object) x 2 (Valence: positive vs. 
negative) x 2 (Modality: picture vs. word) within-subjects design, with response time (RT), accuracy, 
and EEG voltage as the dependent variables. 
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Figure 1. Temporal progression an evaluation trial with examples of social groups of negative and positive 
valence, represented as words or pictures (only one of the stimuli was presented each time). Participants were 
instructed to evaluate the target starting from its onset, and to try not to blink until the appearance of the white 
cross (ITI). 
 
2.4 Electrophysiological recordings 
A set of 64 Ag/AgCl active electrodes connected to a BioSemi Active-Two amplifier system were 
mounted on an elastic cap according to the International 10/20 system to record the continuous neural 
signal by means of ActiView acquisition software (Biosemi, Amsterdam, Netherlands). Electrode 
offsets were kept between ±20 mV, while the signal was sampled at a rate of 1024 Hz with a 24-bit 
resolution. A common mode voltage based on the ActiveTwo’s CMS/DRL feedback loop was used 
for analog-to-digital conversion of recorded voltages for each electrode (cf. to 
https://www.biosemi.com/faq/cms%26drl.htm). Anti-aliasing filters were used and data were band-
pass filtered between 0.01–100 Hz during data acquisition. 
 EEG data preprocessing was performed using the Brainstorm software (Tadel et al., 2011). 
First, the EEG recordings were downsampled offline at 125 Hz and band-pass filtered (0.05 – 40 Hz). 
Bad electrode channels were removed upon visual inspection, as well as movement artefacts. Eye 
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blinks artefacts were removed through independent components analysis (ICA; (Makeig et al., 1996). 
Epochs containing artefacts other than eye movements were removed after visual inspection. One 
subject (female, age 24) was excluded from all further analyses due to the presence of excessive 
movement artefacts. The data were then epoched from -200 to +1500 ms relative to the onset of the 
target and baseline-corrected from -200 ms to target onset. 
 
2.5 Behavioral data analysis 
Behavioral data were preprocessed and analyzed in R (R Core Team, 2016). Data from correct trials 
within 2 SD from each participant’s average were then log-transformaed to reduce the skew of the 
distribution and subjected to a 2 (Category: Social vs. Nonsocial) x 2 (Valence: Positive vs. Negative) 
x 2 (Modality: names vs. pictures) repeated-measures ANOVA. Follow-ups to significant interactions 
consisted of Bonferroni-corrected contrasts. Only results involving interactions with the Category 
factor and yielding significant post-hoc contrasts are reported. 
 
2.6 ERP data analysis 
The time windows for the main components were identified from the existing literature 
(Hinojosa, Carretié, Valcárcel, et al., 2009; D. Zhang et al., 2014; Zhu et al., 2015) and the visual 
inspection of average peak amplitudes. In order not to lose statistical power in quantifying effects 
over several electrodes, eleven regions of interest (ROIs; see Figure 2) were then created by averaging 
the amplitude of the respective electrodes (as in Hinojosa, Carretié, Valcárcel, Méndez-Bértolo, & 
Pozo, 2009). The resulting ERPs were subjected to two 2 (Category: Social vs. Nonsocial) x 2 
(Valence: positive vs. negative) x 2 (Modality: word vs. picture) x 11 (Cluster: [OC, LP, RP, LC,  
RC, LF, RF, FP, MF, MC, MP]) repeated measures ANOVAs, one for each component’s time 
window (150 - 200 ms, 400 - 700 ms and 700 - 1000 ms). Where necessary, the degrees of freedom 
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of the F ratios were adjusted using the Greenhouse–Geisser epsilon correction. Follow-ups to 
significant interactions including Valence consisted of Bonferroni-corrected contrasts of Valence 
effects. Only interactions yielding significant follow-up contrasts are reported. 
 
Figure 2. Clusters of electrodes grouped for statistical analysis of ERPs. OC, occipital, LP, left posterior, 
RP, right posterior, LC, left central, RC, right central, LF, left frontal, RF, right frontal, FP, frontopolar, MF, 
middle frontal, MC, middle central, MP, middle posterior. 
 
2.7 Decoding analysis 
Multivariate classification analyses were performed using the CoSMoMVPA analysis package 
(www.cosmomvpa.org) (Oosterhof, Connolly, & Haxby, 2016) implemented in MATLAB. 
Classification was performed separately for every 8 ms time bin using linear discriminant analysis 
(LDA) classifiers. These were trained to discriminate the patterns of activation across EEG sensors 
for the two valence conditions in one subset of the data, and tested on another. 
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Cross-decoding was conducted separately for Social and Object categories. Training data 
consisted of trials from the Words condition, after which classifiers were tested on trials from the 
Pictures condition. In this way, the decoding performed by the classifier on pictures derived from the 
identification of the same patterns of valence differences that had been learned on word stimuli. The 
correctly identified patterns were thus common to both modalities. To increase the reliability signal-
to-noise ratio and the of the data for the classifier, for each participant and experimental condition 
separately, five averaged trials were created. As the number of correct trials differed between 
participants and within conditions, the averages containing roughly the trials corresponding to each 
experimental block/run, with the constraint that no average was derived from more than one trial 
more than the other averages. 
Given the consistency of the response mappings within participants, to avoid the confound of 
decoding motor responses rather than valence differences (Grootswagers et al., 2017), classifiers were 
trained and tested on the combined data from pairs of participants with opposite mappings. The 
classification accuracy of each participant was calculated by averaging the performance of all the 
classifications containing that participant’s data (i.e., 10 for each subject). The percentage of correct 
predictions of the classifier was used as index of classification accuracy. The classification was 
generalized across train and test times, for which it was repeated for their every possible combination, 
leading to a classification accuracy map of 125 x 125 points (i.e., 1000 ms x 1000 ms with 125 Hz 
resolution) for every comparison in each participant. Individual maps were smoothed with an 
averaging box filter of the size of 3 x 3 time points (i.e., 24 ms in both training and testing time). 
 
2.8 Statistical testing 
To identify time-periods presenting above chance classification accuracy, we used threshold-free 
cluster-estimation procedure (Smith & Nichols, 2009) with default parameters from the 
CoSMoMVPA package (Oosterhof et al., 2016), using multiple comparison correction based on a 
sign-permutation test (with null distributions created from 10,000 bootstrapping iterations). To reveal 
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where decoding performance was significant, the threshold on the statistical maps was set at Z > 2.57 
(i.e., p < .005). The procedure was first applied within each category against the mean of 0.5 decoding 
accuracy and then used to check for significant differences in contrasting the two. 
 
 Results 
3.1 Behavioral results 
Reaction times analysis showed a main effect of category [F(1, 19) = 128.83, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .87] with 
faster responses to non-social than to social categories. No other significant main effects were present. 
Significant first order interactions emerged between category and valence [F(1, 19) = 18.24, p < .001, 
𝜂𝑝
2 = .49], and between category and modality [F(1, 19) = 47.94, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .72], with the former 
indicating how the difference in RTs between social groups and objects was significantly greater in 
the positive relative to the negative valence targets (p = .001), and in pictures relative to words (p < 
.001). Last, a post-hoc analysis of the significant second-order interaction between category, valence 
and modality [F(1, 19) = 8.37, p = .009, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .31], revealed that social groups were evaluated slower 
relative to objects in all valence and modality combinations (all ps < .001) but the negative word one, 
where there was no significant categorical difference (p = .60). (see Figure 3). 
 
Figure 3. Violin plots displaying single participant mean RT distribution and group mean RTs for Object and 
Social category targets divided by valence. Error bars represent ± 1 SE. 
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3.2 ERP results   
150 – 200 ms. The analysis of the P1 time window resulted in a significant three-way interaction 
between Valence, Category and Cluster [F(3.19, 60.53) = 3.28, p = .025, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .15], and a significant 
four-way interaction between Valence, Category, Modality and Cluster [F(2.61, 49.61) = 7.54, p < 
.001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .28]. Follow-up analyses for the word modality evidenced a significant Valence effect in 
the right frontal cluster (p < .05), with a greater amplitude for negative as opposed to positive stimuli 
(p < .05). The effect was only significant for Social groups (p < .05), while the effect for and 
difference from Objects was not significant (both ps > .1). No effects were present for pictures in the 
same cluster. For pictures, a significant Valence effect was present for Objects in the occipital, left 
posterior and left anterior clusters (ps < .05), with no effect for Social groups (ps > .05), and a 
significant difference between categories (ps < .05). A Valence effect for both categories was present 
in the right posterior and the mid frontal clusters (ps < .05), presenting also a significant difference 
between categories (p < .05). This difference was characterized by a greater amplitude for negative 
vs positive stimuli for Objects and a greater amplitude for positive vs negative stimuli for Social 
groups. 
400 – 700 ms. A significant interaction was present between Valence, Category and Cluster 
[F(3.71, 70.49) = 3.27, p = .02, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .15]. At the single cluster level, a marginally significant Valence 
effect, with a greater amplitude for positive stimuli, was only present for words in the central right 
electrodes (p = .07). In the picture modality, the same cluster also presented a significant Valence 
effect for Objects (p < .05), where the difference with Social groups was marginally significant (p = 
.08). 
700 – 1000 ms. Significant interactions between Valence, Modality and Cluster [F(3.84, 72.98) 
= 2.54, p = .049, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .12], Valence, Category and Cluster [F(4.36, 82.75) = 2.62, p = .036, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .12], 
Valence, Category and Modality [F(1, 19) = 6.87, p = .017, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .27] were present in the latest time 
window. These were accompanied by a marginally significant four-way interaction involving 
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Valence, Category, Modality and Cluster [F(3.24, 61.57) = 2.51, p = .063, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .12]. Follow-up 
analyses showed a significant Valence effect in the right posterior cluster for words (p < .05) but not 
for pictures (p > .1). Within this cluster, the effect of Valence was significant for Social groups (p < 
.05) but not for Objects (p > .1), with the difference between the two categories also being significant 
(p < .05). A marginally significant Valence effect in the left central cluster for words only (p = .07), 
with a greater amplitude for negative stimuli, was driven by a significant effect for Social groups (p 
< .05), with no effect for Objects and no significant difference between categories (both ps > .1). In 
the right central cluster, the main effect of Valence (p < .05) was accompanied by two marginally 
significant effects in both categories (ps = .07), in all cases displaying a greater amplitude for positive 
relative to negative word stimuli. For pictures, only a marginally significant Valence effect emerged 
for Social groups in the left posterior region (p = .09). 
 
3.3 Cross-modal valence decoding in social groups and object categories 
Valence cross-decoding results for social groups evidenced a first significant decoder performance 
period at 100-150 ms, followed by a second interval going from ~450 to 1000 ms (see Figure 3A & 
3C). In the case of object categories, only one significant window was present between ~400 and 700 
ms (see Figure 3B & 3C). When contrasting decoder performance between categories, a significantly 
greater decoding performance was found for social groups in two time windows - an early window 
going from 50 to 150 ms and a late window starting at 750 ms up to 1000 ms (see Figure 3D). 
Time-generalisation results evidenced how decoding did not differ based on modality, as all 
significant regions laid on the diagonal (see Figures 4A & 4B). Additionally, a sustained pattern of 
neural activity across modalities was present for social groups in the ~450-1000 ms time window 
(King & Dehaene, 2014), as evidenced by the square-shaped region of significance (see Figure 4A). 
This pattern was unique to social groups and was not present for objects (see Figure 4B). 
 





Figure 4. A) Time-generalization plots resulting from cross-decoding valence of social category and object 
category targets (B). Black contours represent above chance decoding accuracy (p < .001). C) Classification 
accuracy across the time-generalization diagonal for social and object category targets, and (D) their 
difference. Asterisks indicate above chance decoding accuracy time intervals (p < .001). 
 
 Discussion 
With the present study we aimed at identifying the distinctive patterns of brain activity associated 
with the affective processing of social groups and compare it to the one of nonsocial categories. 
Following previous neuropsychological studies (Piretti et al., 2015; Rumiati et al., 2014; Suran, 
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in representing social categories (Lambon Ralph et al., 2016; Mahon & Caramazza, 2011; Simmons 
& Barsalou, 2003), and following studies showing both common and distinct anatomical bases for 
processing social and non-social affective information (Norris et al., 2004), we expected to find 
categorical differences in the temporal dynamics of affective processing, prioritizing the decoding of 
valence in social groups compared to nonsocial categories. To rule out possible confounds generated 
by the input modality and thus isolate affective evaluation, we cross-decoded the effects between two 
different input-modalities (words and images) using MVPA by training of classifiers using neural 
data associated with one modality (e.g. words) and test on data from the other modality (pictures). 
Additionally, we applied time generalization to study the evolution of the affect-specific neural code 
while locating its processing in the temporal dimension of the two input modalities. Our results 
showed significant differences in decoding affective features between social and nonsocial category 
targets. This difference was present in both early and later time windows, and was also reflected in 
overall response times as longer responses to social groups, but just when participants were required 
to make affective judgments. 
Significant decoding performance appeared first at 100 ms post-stimulus that was unique to 
social categories. This earlier decoding might indicate the prioritization of affective processing for 
Social groups over Objects. This effect might also be linked to the early effects found by previous 
ERP studies using words (D. Zhang et al., 2014) and pictures (Zhu et al., 2015) which, although here 
not detected across modalities by univariate analyses, was captured by the greater sensitivity and 
earlier detection attributed to MVPA (Grootswagers et al., 2017). In the second time window of 
significant decoding, above-chance accuracy started approximately at ~400 ms for nonsocial 
categories and at ~450 ms for social groups, reflecting the delay found in the behavioral response. 
This time interval overlaps with the emergence of the late positive components modulated by the 
affective content of both words and pictures (D. Zhang et al., 2014; Zhu et al., 2015), and it represents 
the only time interval in which a significant difference between negative and positive stimuli was 
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present across modalities in the same scalp region when analysing ERPs. While for Objects 
significant decoding in the second time window lasted until ~700 ms, significant affective decoding 
in Social groups extended to 1000 ms post-stimulus and was significantly greater than the one for 
Object categories from ~750 ms on. In previous ERP research, effects occurring in this time window 
are associated with a greater sustained processing of emotional stimuli (Citron, 2012) and an 
enhanced motivational significance (Y. Liu, Huang, McGinnis-Deweese, Keil, & Ding, 2012; Schupp 
et al., 2000; Tempel et al., 2013), which might be intrinsically greater in social groups due to the 
presence of conspecifics. Although more valence effects were identified with the univariate analysis 
for Social groups relative to Objects, none of these were captured across modalities and in the same 
regions. The claim of a more sustained processing of Social groups is also supported by the results of 
the time generalization, presenting a square-shaped pattern of significance, indeed associated with 
sustained patterns of brain activity in the decoded dimension (King & Dehaene, 2014). 
Reaction times to social groups evidenced a slower evaluative response in comparison to 
nonsocial categories. The lack of such differences in ambivalence and categorization times of the 
same targets allows us to exclude the possibility that the disparity was due to social group stimuli 
presenting stronger conflicting (i.e., nondominant) affective associations (Cunningham, Johnson, 
Gatenby, Gore, & Banaji, 2003; Cunningham et al., 2004), or having a delayed semantic access, 
respectively. As suggested by previous neuroimaging studies evidencing slower responses in 
categorizing phrases describing social interactions versus nonsocial actions (Wood, Romero, Makale, 
& Grafman, 2003), we speculate that it is possible that participants activated more complex 
representations for social relative to nonsocial categories to make affective decisions. Evaluative 
processes generally involve a more complex selection of information in comparison to categorization 
(Cunningham et al., 2003), thus task demands might interact with the sociality of the semantic 
categories of target stimuli. For example, the present data might reflect how the evaluation of social 
groups requires accessing all relevant representations of the behaviors commonly associated with 
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them, while in the case of nonsocial categories, just the representation of their common usage may 
have sufficed. 
 In conclusion, our results suggest that processing of affective features comes with distinct 
temporal dynamics for social groups and nonsocial categories, and represent further evidence of the 
interaction between semantic and affective information in the temporal domain. An early decoding 
of affective features for social groups however was not associated with faster responses, as the 
behavioural findings have shown that subjects took longer in providing a behavioural response when 
evaluating social groups as opposed to objects. Interestingly, this effect seems to be independent from 
the timing of access to the more basic person/object categorical representations. It is indeed possible 
that a slower evaluative response to social groups was triggered by self-presentation concerns when 
required to provide judgments about other people following access to the categorical semantic 
information (Nosek, 2005), and thus requiring additional affective processing stages as opposed to 
objects. The same sustained processing of affective information of social groups was also evidenced 
at a neural level, with longer lasting classifier decoding accuracy in a late time window, going beyond 
the behavioural response. We suggest that the delayed response and longer decoding of affective 
features in social groups, possibly associated with more sustained post-semantic attentional processes 
due to more complex representations, supports the hypothesis of a greater relevance of their affective 
features compared to nonsocial categories (Rumiati et al., 2014). As our conclusions are derived from 
a setting explicitly requiring subjects to focus only on affective content, it is possible that its increased 
weight was specific to the present task demands. By directly comparing the neural signatures resulting 
from different tasks, future studies may focus on elucidating which aspects of affective feature 
processing in social groups interact with experimental demands and which ones occur independently 
from it, being thus more intrinsic to their processing. 
 
 





In the present thesis, I investigated the relationship between the representation of social groups and 
the processing of their affective features. I carried out this investigation by comparing social and non-
social category stimuli in three separate studies. The general hypothesis, common to all three studies, 
was that affective features play significantly more weight in social group representations, in thus 
differing from non-social representations. More specifically, I expected this prominent role of 
affective features in social groups representations to be reflected in faster behavioural responses 
following the stimulation of an affective cortical region (Study 1), higher susceptibility to affective 
priming (Study 2), and a better decoding of affective valence from neural activity (Study 3). 
Neuropsychological studies first suggested that the representation of social groups might be 
distinct from that of other semantic categories by reporting patients suffering from neurodegenerative 
disease (Rumiati et al., 2014). Although a specificity for conspecifics at the level of individuals was 
already known (e.g., Miceli et al., 2000; Thompson et al., 2004), by bringing the evidence to the level 
of social groups, the findings allowed for a more direct comparison with other semantic categories 
previously found to present distinct representational bases (for reviews, see Capitani, Laiacona, 
Mahon, & Caramazza, 2003, and Thompson-Schill, 2003). A possible explanation to the emergence 
of category-specificity for social groups has since been attributed to the presence of a special link 
with the processing of affective features, which would make up a significant part of social group 
semantic representations (Rumiati et al., 2014). Further evidence in support of such claim came from 
the study of the neural correlates of social group representations. By studying the brain areas 
commonly damaged in a cohort of patients showing lexical-semantic deficits for social groups, Piretti 
and colleagues (Piretti et al., 2015) identified the possible extent of the underlying neural network. 
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The authors found a co-occurrence of semantic deficits for social categories and widespread brain 
damage affecting to areas like the amygdala, the insula, and the inferior frontal gyrus, all previously 
associated with affective processes (Piretti et al., 2015). From a theoretical perspective, several 
models presented an argument associating social semantic representations with affective processes 
(Lambon Ralph et al., 2016; Mahon & Caramazza, 2011; Simmons & Barsalou, 2003), also calling 
for more evidence about the existence of such connection and its neural correlates (Lambon Ralph et 
al., 2016).  
To fill this gap, in my dissertation I carried our three studies including computer-based tasks in 
conjunction with neuroscientific techniques. More specifically, tasks required subjects to categorize 
(Study 1) or to evaluate (Studies 2-3) lexical and picture stimuli of social groups and non-social 
categories. Each behavioural paradigm was paired with either brain stimulation (TMS; Study 1) or 
neural activity recordings (EEG; Studies 2-3). In the latter case, two analytical approaches were used 
to answer specific research hypotheses, one univariate (ERPs; Study 2), measuring differences in 
activation at specific neural components, and one multivariate (MVPA; Study 3), tapping into the 
study of the brain’s temporal dynamics. 
The results of the Study 1 show how the stimulation of the pars opercularis of the left inferior 
frontal gyrus (LIFGop), previously linked to affective processing (Kensinger & Schacter, 2006; but 
see also Leclerc & Kensinger, 2011), might influence how social groups are represented in the brain. 
This influence was indexed by participants’ faster person/object categorization responses to social 
group names, without altering the speed of the behavioural responses to non-social categories. 
Additionally, these effects were confined to negative social categories, in line with the documented 
association between LIFGop activity and the processing of negative word stimuli (García-Pacios et 
al., 2017; Kensinger & Schacter, 2006; Leclerc & Kensinger, 2011; Van der Cruyssen et al., 2014). 
While my data do not allow us to fully map all the regions causally involved in processing affective 
and semantic content, however they do provide initial evidence on the contribution of an area not 
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previously considered in the domain of social/affective processing. Thus, by demonstrating that the 
effect of LIFGop stimulation is category and valence-specific, my results extend the hub-and-spokes 
model (Lambon Ralph et al., 2016), which placed valence features processing in the orbitofrontal 
cortex (OFC), as they identify an additional potential area contributing to the affective semantic 
representations of social groups. More in general, as the behavioural effect of the stimulation was 
limited to the negative valence social groups, the results also support the claim of a separability 
between areas processing positive and negative valence (Cacioppo et al., 1999) occurring at the third, 
semantic level of affective processing as described in Panksepp’s theory (Panksepp, 1998, 2012). 
In the Study 2, I found that when healthy participants engage in the processing of positive and 
negative affective content via affective priming, affectively congruent social group names presented 
shortly after to be evaluated are processed significantly faster than non-social category names. 
Moreover, this effect was present despite non-social category names being matched for valence 
ratings. This behavioural finding had a neural counterpart in a late right frontal positive component, 
suggesting that social group representations and affective information processing possibly have 
overlapping neural correlates. The priming effect fits the spreading of activation theories of affective 
priming, supporting the existence of an affective semantic node activated by the primes (Fazio, 2001; 
Fazio et al., 1995, 1986). Additionally, the categorical difference in the priming effect extends these 
theories, demonstrating how the strength of such spreading might vary as a function of the target 
word category. As an equal spreading of activation from an affective node (elicited by affective 
priming) to all affectively congruent concepts has been deemed unlikely (Klauer & Musch, 2003), 
my findings suggest that the spreading of activation might be a more selective phenomenon than 
previously thought. When controlling for differences in other word properties and for differences in 
the semantic distance with the primes, as done in Study 2, the strength of the affective priming itself 
could be adopted as an index of reliability on affective features by different concepts. 
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Unlike in Study 1, in Study 2 the greater affective priming response to social groups (vs 
objects) occurred regardless of their valence. Nevertheless, at the level of brain responses, the neural 
correlates of affective priming emerged only for positive social groups. The effect was recorded in a 
later time window of the ERPs, and was strongest in the frontal right electrodes. The distribution of 
the response, its latency, and the greater amplitude for congruent trials together may indicate the 
presence of sustained processes for positive social groups following positive primes, potentially 
related to an increased post-retrieval motivated attention. Although this effect was valence-specific, 
the presence of differences in familiarity between positive and negative words overall, shown having 
an influence in later ERPs (Voss et al., 2010), does not allow to confidently exclude the possibility 
that negative social group targets might have elicited the same effect under matched conditions. 
Indeed, in Study 2, the familiarity matching was only done between categories, and, in order to 
maintain a greater amount of stimuli, not between positive and negative words. 
In Study 3 I used both lexical and pictorial stimuli to investigate the neural correlates of 
affective processing independently of the input modality. The approach allowed me to avoid the 
limitations of Studies 1-2, in which affective processing of social group concepts was investigating 
only with lexical inputs. As conceptual processing of valenced stimuli was previously argued to 
activate an affect processing node in the semantic network, this should occur independently of the 
input modality. The results revealed how a significant decoding of affective valence occurs for social 
groups but not for non-social categories at an early post-stimulus time interval (100-200 ms). Whereas 
an intermediate time window (450-750 ms) revealed an overlap in above chance decoding 
performance of the two categories, above chance performance was present only for social groups in 
a later time window (750-1000 ms). Such pattern suggests that, compared to non-social categories, 
the neural decoding of affective information of social groups might be prioritized in early processing 
stages, going through a similar processing of non-social categories during intermediate stages, an then 
persisting in later stages. This finding might be due to the involvement of areas, such as the amygdala, 
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in which the processing of emotion has been shown to be boosted when originating from a social 
stimulus, and other areas, such as the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), selectively responding to 
emotional social stimuli (Norris et al., 2004), and the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), 
activated during social judgments and impression updating (Hughes, Zaki, & Ambady, 2017). As the 
activity of the amygdala is regarded as automatic and thus occurring at early stages, it is likely that 
the initial decoding of social groups was driven by its activity. As for the later decoding, it is likely 
that more controlled evaluative processes came into play, in line with the reflective role of prefrontal 
areas during evaluations (Cunningham & Zelazo, 2007). These results are consistent with those of 
Study 2, where the priming effect for social groups was evident in the same late time interval, 
generated from electrodes situated approximately above the right DLPFC. It might thus be possible 
that both findings reflect a sustained attention to (Ally & Budson, 2007; Van Strien et al., 2009) or 
further updating of affective semantic content (Cunningham & Zelazo, 2007) in social groups, likely 
extending temporally beyond the forced-choice behavioural response. Unexpectedly, behavioural 
responses showed that participants’ reaction times were relatively longer when evaluating social 
groups, whereas in the semantic categorization task I found no difference with non-social categories. 
As to this latter finding, it is possible that the representations of social categories possess significantly 
more complex affective information accessed by the cognitive system in evaluative contexts (Wood 
et al., 2003), although additional studies will be needed to empirically test such interpretation. 
Future research should be also carried out to address a series of limitations present in my 
studies. First, as the brain stimulation might well affect additional areas connected to the one directly 
stimulated (Massimini et al., 2005), I cannot conclude that the LIFGop is the only area responsible 
for processing affective semantic features. To reach this conclusion a more extended mapping is 
required. As a starting step, given that the effects of the stimulation have been shown to extend to 
homologue areas on the opposite hemisphere (Fitzgerald, Fountain, & Daskalakis, 2006), it would be 
relevant to study whether the stimulation of the right IFGop leads to similar findings. As the brain 
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responses to primed social categories were located in a right frontal region above the DLPFC, which 
comprises the RIFGop, its stimulation may affect the processing of social categories of positive 
affective valence. 
Furthermore, as in Study 1 I used only names as stimuli, it is not possible to know if the role 
of the LIFGop in processing affective information is specific to the lexical domain or whether its 
processing is amodal, and thus independent of the input modality (Fairhall & Caramazza, 2013; 
Leonardelli et al., 2019). The same observation applies to Study 2, as only one modality is taken into 
account. While Study 3 shed light on the correlates of affective processes common to two modalities, 
and captured effects in early and late processing stages, I cannot argue that the recorded 
positive/negative affective decoding occurs automatically; neither can I argue that it generalizes to 
other tasks, as it might only emerge in a setting requiring a forced binary evaluative response. 
Studies 2-3, where participants performed an evaluative task, leave both unanswered the 
question about the automaticity of the recorded neural components. A first distinction can be made 
between automatic and controlled processes, respectively referring to spreading of activation, or early 
access, and task-dependent evaluation and updating(Cunningham & Zelazo, 2007). To disentangle 
these processes, future studies could adopt the same paradigms while manipulating the task 
requirements. Such manipulation could require participants to focus on the semantic category of the 
targets in a categorization task, or on more linguistic, ‘shallow’ aspects of the stimuli (lexical decision 
or naming). Although the effects of the primes may decrease in magnitude, it might be still possible 
to record how brain responses are affected by the interaction between the category of the targets and 
their congruence with the primes. The same approach can be taken in furthering the study of the 
temporal dynamics of affective valence processing, to assess whether the same decoder performance 
differences between social and non-social categories emerge during other tasks. Although an earlier 
decoding might persist, later stages may not be engaged as much as in the evaluative task used in the 
third study, as suggested by the lack of categorical differences in the behavioural control experiment. 
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Although only briefly introduced for exploratory purposes, the study of affective ambivalence 
may also be a promising venue for future research on categorical affective semantic representations 
(Cunningham et al., 2004). Despite the categorical differences in the bahavioral responses of the third 
study could not be related to higher levels of ambivalence for social groups relative to objects, the 
possibility that the consideration given to nondominant affective associations varies from one 
category to the other should not be excluded. Previous research has shown that affective ambiguity 
is more likely to affect reflective stages of processing, particluarly in tasks requiring a forced-choice 
affective evaluation, and correlating with activity in the ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (Cunningham 
et al., 2003). A comparion between social and nonsocial concepts based on the relationship between 
ambivalence and brain activity at single concept level may shed light on this possibility. 
It should be noted that all studies have been primarily concerned with comparing social groups 
and objects, and a comparison with other categories for which selective deficits have been reported, 
like fruits/vegetables (Hart et al., 1983; Samson & Pillon, 2003) and animals (Blundo et al., 2006; 
Caramazza & Shelton, 1998), is missing. While the former could be excluded a priori, emotional 
responses elicited by animals may have a comparable magnitude to that of social groups. 
Nevertheless, even with such comparison, I would expect the same affect-driven category specific 
effects for social groups to emerge. 
While the study of conspecifics at group level was justified by previous research (e.g., Rumiati 
et al., 2014), future studies could also further investigate the extent to which the affective processing 
of social groups differs from that of single individuals in terms of temporal dynamics and underlying 
areas. For instance, as access to social category knowledge has been shown to precede that of 
individual knowledge (Cloutier et al., 2005; Mason & Macrae, 2004), if a direct comparison between 
these two levels of specificity was made using a procedure similar to that of Study 3, I would expect 
valence effects be decoded faster for social groups. However, as in such case one would have to look 
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at a face to recognize the individual, the emotionality of the displayed facial expression might 
introduce an additional level of complexity that will have to be considered. 
As a last note, while the framework I adopted focused on the positive/negative valence 
dimension, it is possible that the study of single emotions may uncover unique processing areas and 
neural components when representing social groups. For example, previous research on social 
cognition has shown that distinct brain areas are activated when social groups elicit emotions that are 
exclusively social (e.g., pity or envy) as compared to non-exclusively social (e.g., disgust; Harris, 
McClure, van den Bos, Cohen, & Fiske, 2007). Accounting for this social exclusivity factor may thus 
provide more insights about the degrees of separation between processing social and non-social 
affective knowledge. 
In conclusion, my thesis provides novel evidence of a separability between social and non-
social categorical knowledge in the affective domain. My results call for future replications to assess 
their robustness and also to overcome possible limitations with the use of multiple input modalities, 
the study of affective processes beyond the dichotomous valence dimension, and the use of multiple 
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APPENDIX 1 





Social categories Objects Social categories Objects 
agricoltori [farmers] anelli [rings] alcolisti [alcoholics] aghi [needles] 
ballerini [dancers] aquiloni [kites] anziani [elderly] bare [coffins] 
dottori [doctors] bambole [dolls] arabi [Arabs] barili [barrels] 
ebrei [Jews] barche [boats] barboni [homeless] bisturi [scalpels] 
infermiere [nurses] carrozze [coaches] dentisti [dentists] coltelli [knives] 
medici [doctors] chiavi [keys] immigrati [immigrants] fucili [rifles] 
modelle [female models] corone [crowns] macellai [butchers] lamette [blades] 
musicisti [musicians] elicotteri [helicopters] militari [military] martelli [hammers] 
operai [workers] gioielli [jewels] negri [Blacks, der.] pistole [guns] 
pescatori [fishermen] palloni [balloons] obesi [obese] posacenere [ashtrays] 
pittori [painters] porte [doors] poliziotti [policemen] pugnali [daggers] 
professori [professors] rossetti [lipsticks] poveri [poor] rasoi [razors] 
scrittori [writers] scooter [scooters] preti [priests] sigarette [cigarettes] 
studenti [students] televisori [televisions] prostitute [prostitutes] siringhe [syringes] 
vigili [traffic policemen] trofei [trophies] suore [nuns] stampelle [crutches] 
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APPENDIX 2 




Social categories Nonsocial categories 
Negative Positive Negative Positive 
aguzzini [tormentors] anziani [elderly] acari [mites] anelli [rings] 
alcolisti [alcoholics] artisti [artists] acidi [acids] aquiloni [kites] 
barboni [homeless] attori [actors] bare [coffins] barche [boats] 
becchini [gravediggers] bagnini [lifeguards] batteri [bacteria] biciclette [bicycles] 
bulimiche [bulimics] ballerini [dancers] bisturi [scalpels] birre [beers] 
bulli [bullies] camerieri [waiters] bombe [bombs] borse [purses] 
detenuti [convicts] capitani [captains] cannoni [cannons] caramelle [candies] 
dittatori [dictators] donne [women] cateteri [catheters] chitarre [guitars] 
drogati [drug addicts] giovani [youth] coltelli [knives] cuscini [pillows] 
estremisti [extremists] insegnanti [teachers] droghe [drugs] diamanti [diamonds] 
fascisti [fascists] maestre [teachers, fem.] fucili [rifles] divani [couches] 
fumatori [smokers] maestri [masters] granate [grenades] finestre [windows] 
grassi [fat people] marinai [sailors] lapidi [tombstones] foglie [leaves] 
infermi [sick] medici [medics] pallottole [bullets] forchette [forks] 
ladri [thieves] modelle [female models] pasticche [tablets] giocattoli [toys] 
militari [military] mogli [wives] pistole [guns] gioielli [jewels] 
negri [Blacks, derog.] operai [workers] proiettili [bullets] libri [books] 
obesi [obese] pittori [painters] protesi [protheses] maglie [sweaters] 
orfani [orphans] poeti [poets] pugnali [daggers] monete [coins] 
perdenti [losers] pompieri [firefighters] sigarette [cigarettes] palloni [balloons] 
poveri [poor] ragazze [girls] siringhe [syringes] perle [pearls] 
psicopatici [psychopaths] ragazzi [boys] tombe [tombs] regali [gifts] 
sadici [sadists] scolari [pupils] tossine [toxins] slitte [sleighs] 
terroni [southerners, derog.] scrittori [writers] trapani [drills] soldi [money] 
tossici [toxics] scultori [sculptors] veleni [poisons] tesori [treasures] 
vandali [vandals] sportive [sportswomen] verruche [warts] trofei [trophies] 
zingari [gypsies] studenti [students] vesciche [blisters] violini [violins] 
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Valence Arousal Concreteness Familiarity Length 
Positive 6.33 (.35) 5.47 (.31) 4.12 (.82) 5.28 (.71) 6.56 (1.13) 
Negative 1.78 (.22) 5.50 (.19) 4.21 (.70) 5.30 (.44) 6.11 (1.05) 
Neutral/# - - - - 6.33 (.94) 
 
Mean valence, arousal, concreteness and familiarity ratings (0 = extremely low; 7 = extremely high) and 





PAURA [FEAR] AMORE [LOVE] 
LUTTO [MOURNING] GIOIA [JOY] 
MORTE [DEATH] FELICE [HAPPY] 
DOLORE [PAIN] VIVACE [LIVELY] 
FERITE [WOUNDS] SORRISO [SMILE] 
INCUBO [NIGHTMARE] TRIONFO [TRIUMPH] 
TRADIRE [BETRAY] VINCERE [TO WIN] 
ANSIOSO [ANXIOUS] SUCCESSO [SUCCESS] 
PERICOLO [DANGER] PASSIONE [PASSION] 
 









Social groups Objects 
Negative Positive Negative Positive 
alcolisti [alcoholics] bambini [children] bare [coffins] anelli [rings] 
barboni [homeless] anziani [elderly] coltelli [knives] biciclette [bicycles] 
detenuti [convicts] suore [nuns] droghe [drugs] chitarre [guitars] 
drogati [junkies] camerieri [waiters] fucili [rifles] cuscini [pillows] 
migrant [migrants] marina [sailors] granate [grenades] libri [books] 
militari [military] ballerina [dancers] manette [handcuffs] matite [pencils] 
obesi [obese] bagnini [lifeguards] pistole [guns] orology [watches] 
prostitute [prostitutes] pompieri [firefighters] sigarette [cigarettes] palloni [balloons] 
terroristi [terrorists] scultori [sculptors] siringhe [syringes] perle [pearls] 
zingari [gypsies] pittori [painters] stampelle [crutches] violini [violins] 
